if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Andrea Attar, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
Thomas Mariotti, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole
Francois Salanie, National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA), University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Alessandro Palma, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), DISAE - Department of Business and Economics
Inna Petrunyk, Leuphana University of Lueneburg
Daniela Vuri, University of Rome Tor Vergata, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Marcella Alsan, Stanford University
Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Jay Bhattacharya, Stanford University - Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Valentina Conti, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Iván Mejía-Guevara, Stanford University
Grant Miller, Stanford University - School of Medicine, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "The Social Costs of Side Trading" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 463, July 2019 ANDREA ATTAR, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
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THOMAS MARIOTTI, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole
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FRANCOIS SALANIE, National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA), University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades, as each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold. First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable requirements. Second, there actually exists a unique budget-feasible allocation robust to side trading, which deprives the planner from any capacity to redistribute resources between different types of consumers. We discuss the relevance of our results for insurance and financial markets. "Air Pollution During Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes in Italy"
CEIS Working Paper No. 464, July 2019 ALESSANDRO PALMA, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), DISAE - Department of Business and Economics
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INNA PETRUNYK, Leuphana University of Lueneburg
DANIELA VURI, University of Rome Tor Vergata, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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We investigate the impact of fetal exposure to air pollution on health outcomes at birth in Italy in the 2000s combining information on mother’s residential location from birth certificates with information on PM10 concentrations from air quality monitors.The potential endogeneity deriving from differential pollution exposure is addressed by exploiting as-good-as-random variation in rainfall shocks as an instrumental variable for air pollution concentrations. Our results show that both average levels of PM10 and days above the hazard limit have detrimental effects on birth weight, duration of gestation as well as overall health status at birth. These effects are mainly driven by pollution exposure during the third trimester of pregnancy and further differ in size with respect to the maternal socio-economic status, suggesting that babies born to socially disadvantaged mothers are more vulnerable. Given the non negligible effects of pollution on birth outcomes, further policy efforts are needed to fully protect fetuses from the adverse effects of air pollution and to mitigate the environmental inequality of health at birth. "Technological Progress and Health Convergence: The Case of Penicillin in Post-War ITALY"
CEIS Working Paper No. 465 MARCELLA ALSAN, Stanford University
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VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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JAY BHATTACHARYA, Stanford University - Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
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VALENTINA CONTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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IVÁN MEJÍA-GUEVARA, Stanford University
GRANT MILLER, Stanford University - School of Medicine, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
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Throughout history, technological progress has transformed population health, but the distributional effects of these gains are unclear. New substitutes for older, more expensive health technologies can produce convergence in population health outcomes, but may also be prone to "elite capture" leading to divergence. This paper studies the case of penicillin using detailed mortality statistics and exploiting its sharply-timed introduction in Italy after World War II. We fi
nd penicillin reduced both the mean and standard deviation of infectious diseases mortality, leading to substantial convergence across disparate regions of Italy. Our results do not appear to be confounded by competing risks or mortality patterns associated with World War II. | | ^top
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