if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Clara Calini, Independent
Alessandra Catenazzo, Independent
Elisabetta Iossa, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Emanuele Brancati, Sapienza University of Rome, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Sapienza University of Rome - Faculty of Economics
Paolo E. Giordani, LUISS "Guido Carli" University
Maurizio Iacopetta, OFCE (Centre de recherche en Economie de Sciences Po), SKEMA Business School - Sophia Antipolis Campus
Raoul Minetti, Michigan State University Paolo Dai Pra, University of Padua - Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics
Paolo Pigato, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Using Multiple Tools to Enhance Competition in Public Procurement " 
CEIS Working Paper No. 594 CLARA CALINI, Independent
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ALESSANDRA CATENAZZO, Independent
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ELISABETTA IOSSA, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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Well-functioning competitive procurement is essential to reach efficiency of public services and public spending. Drawing from the experience of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, this paper argues that fostering competition in public procurement is most effective when employing a diverse range of tools. First, identifying the functioning of compensatory mechanisms that result in anomalous bidding behaviour, as well as diversifying the sources of information, is important for effectively prosecuting bid rigging ex post and helping contracting authorities detect anticompetitive conduct. Second, ex ante advocacy contributes to enhance the competence of public buyers, helping them design pro-competitive procurement processes. Third, adopting legality rating systems incentivizes compliance with competition law and also helps select the most efficient bidder. The paper makes these points whilst reviewing enforcement practice. "Credit Markets, Corporate Governance and Growth"
CEIS Working Paper No. 595 EMANUELE BRANCATI, Sapienza University of Rome, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Sapienza University of Rome - Faculty of Economics
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PAOLO E. GIORDANI, LUISS "Guido Carli" University
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MAURIZIO IACOPETTA, OFCE (Centre de recherche en Economie de Sciences Po), SKEMA Business School - Sophia Antipolis Campus
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RAOUL MINETTI, Michigan State University
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We investigate the interaction between the banking sector and corporate governance in an economy where banks act both as monitors of managerial frictions and as facilitators of new firm creation. We find that, when banks engage in relational lending with borrowing firms, these two activities can generate different consequences for incumbent firms' investment and growth. The calibrated general equilibrium model reveals that positive shocks to banks' monitoring efficiency boost incumbents' investments and growth in both the short and the long run. Increases in banks' efficiency at entry can instead depress investment and growth by exacerbating managers' incentives to divert resources for out-of-firm projects. Quantitative experiments indicate that banking development that increases the overall banking efficiency can induce a hump-shaped response of output growth and welfare. We test the mechanisms of the model using data from the Italian corporate and banking sector. "A Stochastic Volatility Approximation for a Tick-by-Tick Price Model with Mean-Field Interaction"
CEIS Working Paper No. 596 PAOLO DAI PRA, University of Padua - Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics
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PAOLO PIGATO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance We consider a tick-by-tick model of price formation, in which buy and sell orders are modeled as self-exciting point processes (Hawkes process), similar to the one in [El Euch, Fukasawa, Rosenbaum, The microstructural foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility, Finance and Stochastics, 2018]. We adopt an agent based approach by studying the aggregation of a large number of these point processes, mutually interacting in a mean-field sense. The financial interpretation is that of an asset on which several labeled agents place buy and sell orders following these point processes, influencing the price. The mean-field interaction introduces positive correlations between order volumes coming from different agents that reflect features of real markets such as herd behavior and contagion. When the large scale limit of the aggregated asset price is computed, if parameters are set to a critical value, a singular phenomenon occurs: the aggregated model converges to a stochastic volatility model with leverage effect and faster-than-linear mean reversion of the volatility process. The faster-than-linear mean reversion of the volatility process is supported by econometric evidence, and we have linked it in [Dai Pra, Pigato, Multi-scaling of moments in stochastic volatility models, Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 2015] to the observed multifractal behavior of assets prices and market indices. This seems connected to the Statistical Physics perspective that expects anomalous scaling properties to arise in the critical regime. | | ^top
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