if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Sara Mancini, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Nazaria Solferino, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics Daniela Teresa di Cagno, LUISS Guido Carli
Werner Güth, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Luiss Guido Carli University
Tim Lohse, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Francesca Marazzi, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Lorenzo Spadoni, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio Clarissa Lotti, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Relational Skills and Corporate Productivity" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 530, 2022 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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SARA MANCINI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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NAZARIA SOLFERINO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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Based on results of the different fields of the game theoretic literature on strategic interactions and social dilemmas, gift exchange and procedural utility, we argue that corporate social responsibility and relational skills i) with other firms; ii) between employers and workers iii) among workers and iv) with stakeholders are associated to positive effects on productivity. We test our research hypothesis on a large representative sample of Italian firms including the universe of medium and large companies and accounting for 91.3 percent of domestic employees. We find that companies with higher relational skills report significantly higher value added per worker after controlling for relevant concurring factors. More specifically, the identified significant skill related components are: i) corporate policies considering strategic workers’ wellbeing; ii) team working attitudes considered as priority soft skills when hiring workers; iii) initiatives in favour of the productive network operating in the same local area and iv) involvement of stakeholders in CSR projects. "Who Cares When Value (Mis)reporting May Be Found Out?"
CEIS Working Paper No. 531 DANIELA TERESA DI CAGNO, LUISS Guido Carli
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WERNER GÃœTH, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Luiss Guido Carli University
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TIM LOHSE, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
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FRANCESCA MARAZZI, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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LORENZO SPADONI, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio
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In an ultimatum bargaining, we investigate lying as falsely stating what one privately knows without, however, excluding that others find out the truth. Specifically, we modify the Acquiring-a-Company game. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, they can also learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally accepts or not. Two-thirds of all sellers exaggerate the company’s value (especially if the true value is small) but increasing the leak probability surprisingly only mildly increases truth telling. Instead, it reduces the size of the lies. Moreover, it decreases overreporting (exaggerating the value to sell at a higher price) but increases underreporting (stating values below the actual ones to increases chances of trade). Buyers who found out value misreporting anchor their price proposals on the true value but do not explicitly discriminate against liars. In contrast, sellers are fully opportunistic and make their acceptance decision mainly dependent on whether the resulting payoff is positive. Thus, morality concerns do not seem to matter much in this market exchange. Altogether probabilistic leaks enhance trade and welfare what suggests to politically facilitate and encourage e.g. whistle blowing. "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization"
CEIS Working Paper No. 532 CLARISSA LOTTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF
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An influential study by Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) exploits the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy to identify the amount and sources of public waste. Among other findings, it estimates that purchasing through a central agency directly saves 28% on prices. We find that centralized prices also have significant indirect effects, leading to a 17.7% reduction among non-centralized ones. The indirect effects of centralization appear driven by informational externalities – rather than an improved outside option – on less competent public buyers purchasing more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings also increases the estimate of direct ones. | | ^top
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