if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Esther Acquah, Universidad de Alicante
Lorenzo Carbonari, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"
Alessio Farcomeni, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Giovanni Trovato, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Gianluigi Conzo, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance Daniela Teresa di Cagno, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Lorenzo Ferrari, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Werner Güth, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Luiss Guido Carli University
Vittorio Larocca, Luiss Guido Carli University | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Institutions and Economic Development: New Measurements and Evidence" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 521 ESTHER ACQUAH, Universidad de Alicante
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LORENZO CARBONARI, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"
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ALESSIO FARCOMENI, affiliation not provided to SSRN
GIOVANNI TROVATO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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We propose a new set of indices to capture the multidimensionality of a country's institutional quality. Our indices are obtained by employing a dimension reduction approach on the institutional variables provided by the Frazer Institute (2018). We estimate the impact that our measures of institutional quality have on the level and the growth rate of per capita GDP, using a large sample of countries over the period 1980-2015. To identify the causal effect of our measures of institutional quality on a country's GDP dynamics we employ the Generalized Propensity Score method. Institutions matter especially in low and middle-income countries, and not all institutions are alike for economic development. For this group of countries, we find: i) a positive correlation between our main institutional index and the GDP growth and ii) that improvement in the reliability and fairness of the legal system leads to a higher long-run per capita GDP level. We also document non-linearities in the causal effects that different institutions have on growth, and the presence of threshold effects. "Resilience, Social Capital, Active Citizenship and Subjective Wellbeing: the Contribution of Generativity"
CEIS Working Paper No. 522 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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GIANLUIGI CONZO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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We define generativity as the combination of creativity and care for others wellbeing. Based on John Stuart Mill, Robert Kennedy and Antonio Genovesi quotes we test several research hypotheses on the available waves of the European Social Survey and find that generativity is associated positively and significantly with subjective wellbeing (under the different dimensions of life satisfaction and positive affect), resilience, interpersonal trust, active citizenship and participation to political elections. Our findings are robust across survey waves, gender, age, education splits and significant in estimates considering only individuals living in the same country. With an IV approach we provide evidence that the investigated nexus hides a direct causality link from all our the dependent variables. "Experimental Analysis of Endogenous Institutional Choice: Constantly Revealing Versus Ad-Hoc Contracting"
CEIS Working Paper No. 523 DANIELA TERESA DI CAGNO, affiliation not provided to SSRN
LORENZO FERRARI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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WERNER GÃœTH, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Luiss Guido Carli University
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VITTORIO LAROCCA, Luiss Guido Carli University
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Ad-hoc contracting allows to quickly react to changes which could be neglected or noticed too late in case of constant contracting. But always deciding anew, e.g., how much and what to order in commercial and what to buy in private life, is too cumbersome. To capture the cognitive burden of ad-hoc contracting and how it can be avoided by constant contracting, our setup confronts ad-hoc pricing, which is non-revealing, with constantly revealing pricing. The experiment modifies the Acquiring-a-Company game by reversing the responsibility for pricing to the seller who proposes a price together with a cheap-talk value message in case of ad-hoc pricing and, in case of constantly revealing contracting the seller demands a constant surplus share for all periodic interactions. The experiment lets sellers decide between constantly revealing prices and ad-hoc non-revealing prices. Buyers, either aware of the seller’s surplus share or only of the periodic value message and price, can accept or reject trade in each of several successive periods played by the same pair, a seller and a buyer participant. Will sellers opt for constant pricing already without experience or ad-hoc pricing? And will one, when more experienced, opt for what has been more profitable? | | ^top
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