if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Federico Belotti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
Chris Bojke, Tower House
Adriana Castelli, Centre for Health Economics, University of York
Katja GraÅ¡iÄ, University of York - Centre for Health Economics
Joanna Kopinska, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS)
Andrea Piano Mortari, CEIS Tor Vergata
Andrew Street, University of York (UK) Jeffrey V. Butler, Dept. of Economics, University of California, Merced, Louisiana State University
Danila Serra, Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics
Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF Germana Corrado, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Luisa Corrado, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Giuseppe De Michele, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Francesco Salustri, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Healthcare Sector to Productivity. Evidence from Italy and UK from 2004 to 2011" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 418 VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Email:
">
FEDERICO BELOTTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
Email:
">
CHRIS BOJKE, Tower House
Email:
">
ADRIANA CASTELLI, Centre for Health Economics, University of York
Email:
">
KATJA GRAŠIČ, University of York - Centre for Health Economics
Email:
">
JOANNA KOPINSKA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS)
Email:
">
ANDREA PIANO MORTARI, CEIS Tor Vergata
Email:
">
ANDREW STREET, University of York (UK)
Email:
">
We assess the productivity growth of the English and Italian healthcare systems over the period from 2004 to 2011. The English (NHS) and the Italian (SSN) healthcare systems share many similar features, facilitating comparison: basic founding principles, financing, organization, management, and size. We measure productivity growth as the rate of change in outputs over the rate of change in inputs. We find that the overall NHS productivity growth index increased by 10% over the whole period, at an average of 1.39% per year, while SSN productivity increased overall by 5%, at an average of 0.73% per year. Differential growth reflects different policy objectives. In England, the NHS focused on increasing activity, reducing waiting times and improving quality. Italy focused more on cost containment and rationalized provision, in the hope that this would reduce unjustified and inappropriate provision of services. "Motivating Whistleblowers"
CEIS Working Paper No. 419 JEFFREY V. BUTLER, Dept. of Economics, University of California, Merced, Louisiana State University
Email:
">
DANILA SERRA, Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics
Email:
">
GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF
Email:
">
Law-breaking activities within an organization benefiting the firm at the expense of the general public are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We employ a novel laboratory experiment to investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval, and their interactions, affect the decision to blow the whistle. Experimental results show that: i) financial rewards significantly increase the likelihood of whistleblowing and do not substantially crowd out non-monetary motivations activated by expectations of social judgment; and ii) the possibility of social judgment decreases (increases) whistleblowing when the public is unaware (aware) of the negative externalities generated by fraud, suggesting that whistleblowers are at least partly motivated by a desire for social approval. Our findings suggest that whistleblowers on corporate fraud should be financially rewarded and should be shielded from public/media scrutiny when the social cost of the illegal activity is not visible or salient to the public. We also find evidence of an interesting relationship between political orientation and social judgment: while left-leaning subjects react to the possibility of receiving social approval or disapproval as expected, right-leaning people are unaffected by it. "Are Perceptions of Corruption Matching Reality? Theory and Evidence from Microdata"
CEIS Working Paper No. 420 GERMANA CORRADO, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
LUISA CORRADO, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Email:
">
GIUSEPPE DE MICHELE, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
FRANCESCO SALUSTRI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics
Email:
">
Some criticism has been raised on the actual capability of corruption perception-based indices to gauge the essence of concepts they aim to measure. One can argue that perceptions about corruption are not matching reality and could be the reflection of distorted truth. Based on this evidence we provide a theoretical ground for the corruption decision-making process (objective corruption) and the corruption perception-making process (subjective corruption) which accounts for the role of media attention. From the theoretical model we are able to derive testable implications for the empirical analysis, i.e. whether socio and cultural norms can explain the gap between the two measures of corruption across Europe. We employ a generalised setting of the structural equation models to build latent indices of objective and subjective corruption from our microdata exploiting the information on various economic, geographic and socio-demographic factors that can affect the perception and the experience of corruption practices. The resulting indices allow us to define country rankings for both types of corruption and draw a geopolitical picture of the phenomenon across Europe. We also show that countries where the quality of media is higher are associated with lower differences between perceived and real corruption. | | ^top
About this eJournal Submissions To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
">
Distributed by Economics Research Network (ERN), a division of Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Directors ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTERS PAPERS MICHAEL C. JENSEN
SSRN, Harvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit
Email:
">
Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for ERN-RES. | | | | | | Subscription Management You can change your journal subscriptions by logging into SSRN User HQ. If you have questions or problems with this process, please email
">
or call 877-SSRNHelp (877.777.6435 or 212.448.2500). Outside of the United States, call 00+1+212+4482500. | | Site Subscription Membership Many university departments and other institutions have purchased site subscriptions covering all of the eJournals in a particular network. If you want to subscribe to any of the SSRN eJournals, you may be able to do so without charge by first checking to see if your institution currently has a site subscription. To do this please click on any of the following URLs. Instructions for joining the site are included on these pages. If your institution or department is not listed as a site, we would be happy to work with you to set one up. Please contact
">
for more information. | | Individual Membership (for those not covered by a site subscription) Join a site subscription, request a trial subscription, or purchase a subscription within the SSRN User HeadQuarters: https://hq.ssrn.com/Subscriptions.cfm | | Financial Hardship If you are undergoing financial hardship and believe you cannot pay for an eJournal, please send a detailed explanation to
">
| |
To ensure delivery of this eJournal, please add
">
(Economics Research Network) to your email contact list. If you are missing an issue or are having any problems with your subscription, please Email
">
or call 877-SSRNHELP (877.777.6435 or 585.442.8170). FORWARDING & REDISTRIBUTION Subscriptions to the journal are for single users. You may forward a particular eJournal issue, or an excerpt from an issue, to an individual or individuals who might be interested in it. It is a violation of copyright to redistribute this eJournal on a recurring basis to another person or persons, without the permission of Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. For information about individual subscriptions and site subscriptions, please contact us at
">
| | Copyright © 2017 Elsevier, Inc. All Rights Reserved | |
|
