if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Andrea Attar, IDEI, Université de Toulouse I., University of Roma II, Tor Vergata
Thomas Mariotti, University of Toulouse I
Francois Salanie, National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA), University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Gian Luigi Albano, Consip S.p.A./Consip Ltd (The National Central Purchasing Body)
Cesi Berardino, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Tor Vergata Economics University Foundation
Alberto Iozzi, Universita degli Studi di Roma Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Federico Belotti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
Ludovico Carrino, King's College London, Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia
Andrea Piano Mortari, CEIS Tor Vergata | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 403 ANDREA ATTAR, IDEI, Université de Toulouse I., University of Roma II, Tor Vergata
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THOMAS MARIOTTI, University of Toulouse I
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FRANCOIS SALANIE, National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA), University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for entry to be unprofitable in markets with adverse selection is that that no buyer type be willing to trade at a price above the expected unit cost of serving those types who are weakly more eager to trade than her. We provide two applications of this result. First, we characterize cases in which market breakdown occurs, thereby generalizing the main result of Hendren (2013). Second, we characterize entry-proof tariffs on nonexclusive active markets, thereby generalizing the main result of Glosten (1994). Our analysis paves the way to new tests of adverse selection, notably besides the case of inactive markets studied by Hendren (2013). "Teaching an Old Dog a New Trick: Reserve Price and Unverifiable Quality in Repeated Procurement"
CEIS Working Paper No. 404 GIAN LUIGI ALBANO, Consip S.p.A./Consip Ltd (The National Central Purchasing Body)
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CESI BERARDINO, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Tor Vergata Economics University Foundation
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ALBERTO IOZZI, Universita degli Studi di Roma
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In procurement markets, unverifiable quality provision may be obtained either by direct negotiation or by competitive processes which discriminate firms on the basis of their past performance. However, discrimination is not allowed in many institutional contexts. We show that a non-discriminatory competitive process with a reserve price may allow the buyer to yield an efficient allocation of the contract and to implement the level of quality desired by the buyer. Quality enforcement arises out of a relational contract whereby the buyer threatens to set a 'low' reserve price in future competitive tendering processes if any contractor fails to provide the required quality. We study an infinitely repeated procurement model with many firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms' cost, in which, in each period, the buyer runs a standard low-price auction with reserve price. We study the cases of players using grim trigger strategies, analysing both the case of a committed and uncommitted buyer. We find that a competitive process with reserve price is able to elicit the desired level of unverifiable quality provided that the buyer's valuation of the project is not too high and the value of quality is not too low; under these conditions, the buyer can credibly threaten the firms to set, in case a contractor fails to deliver the required quality level, a reserve price so low that no firm is willing to participate to the tender. A committed buyer can elicit the desired quality level for a wider range of preference parameters. "The Future of Long Term Care in Europe. An Investigation Using a Dynamic Microsimulation Model"
CEIS Working Paper No. 405 VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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FEDERICO BELOTTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
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LUDOVICO CARRINO, King's College London, Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia
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ANDREA PIANO MORTARI, CEIS Tor Vergata
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In this paper we investigate the evolution of public European LTC systems in the forthcoming decades, using the Europe Future Elderly Model (EuFEM), a dynamic microsimulation model which projects the health and socio-economic characteristics of the 50 population of ten European countries, augmented with the explicit modelling of the eligibility rules of 5 countries. The use of SHARE data allows to have a better understanding of the trends in the demand for LTC differentiated by age groups, gender, and other demographic and social characteristics in order to better assess the distributional effects. We estimate the future potential coverage (or gap of coverage) of each national/regional public home-care system, and then disentangle the differences between countries in a population and a regulation effects. Our analysis offers new insights on how would the demand for LTC evolve over time, what would the distributional effects of different LTC policies be if no action is taken, and what could be potential impact of alternative care policies. | | ^top
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