if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF
Decio Coviello, University of Roma "Tor Vergata"
Andrea Guglielmo, University of Wisconsin - Madison Mauro Bernardi, University of Padova
Leopoldo Catania, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Vittorio Pelligra, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
Serena Taurino, University of Rome Tor Vergata | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 361 GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', EIEF
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DECIO COVIELLO, University of Roma "Tor Vergata"
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ANDREA GUGLIELMO, University of Wisconsin - Madison
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We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions. "The Model Confidence Set Package for R"
CEIS Working Paper No. 362 MAURO BERNARDI, University of Padova
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LEOPOLDO CATANIA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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This paper presents the R package MCS which implements the Model Confidence Set (MCS) procedure recently developed by Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2011). The Hansen's procedure consists on a sequence of tests which permits to construct a set of "superior" models, where the null hypothesis of Equal Predictive Ability (EPA) is not rejected at a certain confidence level. The EPA statistic tests is calculated for an arbitrary loss function, meaning that we could test models on various aspects, for example punctual forecasts. The relevance of the package is shown using an example which aims at illustrating in details the use of the functions provided by the package. The example compares the ability of different models belonging to the ARCH family to predict large financial losses. We also discuss the implementation of the ARCH-type models and their maximum likelihood estimation using the popular R package rugarch developed by Ghalanos (2014). "Other Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data"
CEIS Working Paper No. 363 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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VITTORIO PELLIGRA, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
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SERENA TAURINO, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we defi
ne as strong cooperators) are signi
ficantly more satis
ed with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the observed experimental and satisfaction fi
ndings. | | ^top
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