if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Stefano Caiazza, Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata - Dipartimento di Impresa Governo Filosofia
Matteo Cotugno, University of Catania, SDA Bocconi School of Management
Franco Fiordelisi, University of Rome III, Italy
Valeria Stefanelli, University of Salento - Department of Economic Science Ricardo Flores-Fillol, Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV)
Alberto Iozzi, Universita degli Studi di Roma
Tommaso M. Valletti, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Maria Bachelet, University of Rome II
Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
Fabiola Ricciardini, Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - National Institute of Statistics (Istat) | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Bank Stability and Enforcement Actions in Banking" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 334 STEFANO CAIAZZA, Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata - Dipartimento di Impresa Governo Filosofia
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MATTEO COTUGNO, University of Catania, SDA Bocconi School of Management
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FRANCO FIORDELISI, University of Rome III, Italy
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VALERIA STEFANELLI, University of Salento - Department of Economic Science
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This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of the enforcement actions (sanctions) imposed by supervisory authorities for banks. Focusing on a sample of Italian banks between 2005 and 2012, we found 302 sanctions regarding 3,588 persons (i.e. Board of directors, Top Managers, and Chief Executive Officers) were sanctioned in banks. We have three main results. First, enforcement actions are given to banks having high credit risk and poor Return on Assets (both one and two years in before the sanction). Second, sanctioned banks are unable to change their conduct in the first year following the enforcement sanction and the stability levels do not improve. Rather, it takes at least two years after an enforcement action so that banks are able to improve their stability. We also provide evidence that socio-eco-demographic differences in Italy have a substantial impact on the banks reaction after enforcement actions. "Platform Pricing and Consumer Foresight: The Case of Airports"
CEIS Working Paper No. 335 RICARDO FLORES-FILLOL, Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV)
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ALBERTO IOZZI, Universita degli Studi di Roma
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TOMMASO M. VALLETTI, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by choosing the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. "Not Feeling Well… (True or Exhaggerated?) Health (Un)Satisfaction as a Leading Health Indicator"
CEIS Working Paper No. 336 MARIA BACHELET, University of Rome II
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LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
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FABIOLA RICCIARDINI, Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - National Institute of Statistics (Istat)
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A desirable property of subjective wellbeing indicators is their capacity to predict future objective outcomes. In our paper we provide novel cross-country original evidence documenting that lagged health (un)satisfaction is a leading health indicator, that is, a significant predictor of future changes in health conditions on a large sample of Europeans aged above 50. We find that, after controlling for attrition bias, lagged (un)satisfaction with health is significantly and positively correlated with changes in the number of chronic diseases, net of the concurring impact of levels and changes in socio-demographic factors and health styles, country and regional health system effects and declared symptoms. Our findings are robust in age, gender, education and income class splits and are significant when separately estimated in the 13 countries of our sample. We further test the ordinal predictive properties of the health (un)satisfaction indicator in magnitude and statistical significance. Illness specific estimates document that the impact of lagged health (un)satisfaction is significant on ulcer, hypertension, arthritis and cholesterol (and weakly so on cataracts, hip or femoral fracture and lung diseases), while having a robust and significant effect on the probability of contracting cancer. | | ^top
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