if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Marc Bourreau, Telecom ParisTech, CREST
Frago Kourandi, Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics
Tommaso M. Valletti, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Francesco Saverio Mennini, University of Rome II - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Kingston University - School of Accounting and Finance
Andrea Marcellusi, University of Rome II - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), University of Rome I
Massimo Andreoni, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"
Antonio Gasbarrini, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Rome
Salvatore Salomone, University of Catania
Antonio Craxì, University of Palermo Pasquale L. Scandizzo, University of Rome | | CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 307 MARC BOURREAU, Telecom ParisTech, CREST
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FRAGO KOURANDI, Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics
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TOMMASO M. VALLETTI, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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We propose a two-sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CPs). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content.Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CPs which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We …find that under discrimination investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner’s dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination. "Health Policy Model: Long-Term Predictive Results Associated with the Management of HCV-Induced Diseases in Italy"
CEIS Working Paper No. 308 FRANCESCO SAVERIO MENNINI, University of Rome II - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Kingston University - School of Accounting and Finance
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ANDREA MARCELLUSI, University of Rome II - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), University of Rome I
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MASSIMO ANDREONI, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"
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ANTONIO GASBARRINI, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Rome
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SALVATORE SALOMONE, University of Catania
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ANTONIO CRAXÌ, University of Palermo
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Background: This study is aimed at describing the epidemiological and economic burden that HCV will generate in the next few years in Italy. Furthermore, the impact that future anti-HCV treatments may have on the burden of disease was considered. The analysis has been developed over the period 2013-2030 from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) perspective.
Methods: A published system dynamic model was adapted for Italy in order to quantify the HCV-infected population, the disease progression and the associated cost from 1950 to 2030. The model structure was based on transition probabilities reflecting the natural history of the disease. In order to estimate the efficacy of current anti-HCV treatment strategies for different Genotypes, it was estimated the sustained virological response (SVR) rate in registration clinical trials for both Boceprevir and Telaprevir. It was assumed that the efficacy for patients treated with peginterferon ribavirin was equal to the placebo arm of randomized clinical trial (RCT) relating to Boceprevir and Telaprevir. According to the aim of the study, only direct healthcare costs (hospital admissions, drugs, treatment and care of patients) incurred by the Italian NHS have been included in the model. Costs have been extrapolated by the published scientific literature available in Italy and actualized at 2011 ISTAT Price Index system for monetary revaluation. Three different scenario was assumed in order to evaluate the impact of future anti-HCV treatments may have on the burden of disease.
Results: Overall, in Italy 1.2 million infected subjects were estimated in 2012. Out of these, about 211 thousand patients were diagnosed, while about 11,800 subjects are actually being treated with anti-HCV drugs. A reduction of healthcare costs is associated with a prevalence decrease. Indeed, once the spending peak is reached during this decade (about € 527 million), the model predicts a cost reduction in the following 18 years. In 2030, due to the more effective treatments currently available, the direct healthcare cost associated with the management of HCV patients HCV may reach € 346 million (-34.3% compared to 2012). The first scenario (new treatment in 2015 with SVR=90% and same number of treated patients) was associated with a significant reduction in HCV-induced clinical consequences (prevalence=-3%) and a decrease in healthcare direct expenses corresponding to € 11.1 million. The second scenario (increasing treated patients until 12,790) produced an incremental cost reduction of € 7.3 million, reaching a net decrease equal to € 18.4 million. In the third scenario (treated patients=16,770), a higher net healthcare direct cost decrease vs the base-case (€ 44.0 million ) was estimated.
Conclusions: This study does not have the pretension of being or creating a model of epidemiological projection. Its primary objective is to supply data and a careful consideration for an encourage dialogue among the different professionals fully involved in the management of patients with HCV-induced chronic infection, and to suggest a valuable tool for future health policy strategy. "The Social Rate of Discount, Climate Change and Real Options"
CEIS Working Paper No. 309 PASQUALE L. SCANDIZZO, University of Rome
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This paper examines the controversial problem of the choice of the social discount rate in development projects, by focusing on the investment required to adapt to climate change, considering the threats to food security and the needs for human and natural capital, especially for developing countries. Because climate change introduces negative trends and time increasing volatilities both in production and in consumption, social rates of discount can only be estimated within a framework of dynamic uncertainty. For this purpose, climate change can be modeled as a twin stochastic process of the geometric Brownian motion variety, affecting both consumption and productive capacity. Unlike the case of deterministic neoclassical growth, and contrary to the usual estimates for project evaluation, the stochastic nature of climate changes links the social discount rate (SDR) to volatility in two distinct and important ways. On the side of consumption and growth, the SDR is reduced by the likely negative effects of climate change (CC) on growth and food security. It also becomes dependent on the fact that the volatility of growth favors the accumulation of precautionary savings and thus reduces the rate of fall of the value of consumption over time. On the side of production capacity, the SDR is also reduced by the negative effect of CC on the productivity of capital and by the fact that the opportunity cost of the displacement of private investment under dynamic uncertainty is lowered by the value of the options to invest when more information will be available. | | ^top About this eJournal Submissions To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
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Harvard Business School, Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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