if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
Giacomo Degli Antoni, University of Milan, Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
Stefania Ottone, University of Milan, Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
Nazaria Solferino, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics Marco Centoni, University Lumsa
Gianluca Cubadda, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics Roy Cerqueti, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Raffaella Coppier, Università degli Studi di Macerata - Department of Economic & Financial Institutions (DIEF)
Gustavo Piga, University of Rome | | CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Luigi Paganetto - President, Pasquale Lucio Scandizzo - Director "Allocation Criteria Under Task Performance: The Gendered Preference for Protection" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 214 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
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GIACOMO DEGLI ANTONI, University of Milan, Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
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STEFANIA OTTONE, University of Milan, Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
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NAZARIA SOLFERINO, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
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We device a randomized experiment with task performance in which players directly decide allocation criteria (with/without) veil of ignorance on payoff distribution under different criteria in a stakeholder/spectator position. Our main result is a strong and significant gender effect: women choose significantly more protection (that is, they choose criteria in which a part or all the total sum of money that must be allocated among participants is equally distributed) before (but not after) the removal of the veil of ignorance. They also reveal less overconfidence and significantly higher civicness and inequality aversion in ex post questionnaire responses, even though such differences are not enough to fully capture our main result. The puzzle when interpreting it is that the gendered preference for protection exists not only for stakeholders but also for spectators while it disappears for both once we remove the veil of ignorance. This makes it impossible to explain it exclusively with risk or competition aversion. "Modelling Comovements of Economic Time Series: A Selective Survey"
CEIS Working Paper No. 215 MARCO CENTONI, University Lumsa
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GIANLUCA CUBADDA, University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics
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Modelling comovements amongst multiple economic variables takes up a relevant part of the literature in time series econometrics. Comovement can be defined as 'move together', that is as movement that several series have in common. The pattern of the series could be of different nature, such as trend, cycles, seasonality, being the results of different driving forces. As a results, series that comove share some common features. Common trends, common cycles, common seasonality are terms that are often found in the literature, different in scope but all aimed at modeling common behavior of the series. However, modeling comovements is not only a statistical matter, since in many cases common features are predicted by economic theory, resulting from the optimizing behavior of economic agents. "Corruption, Growth and Ethnic Fractionalization: A Theoretical Model"
CEIS Working Paper No. 216 ROY CERQUETI, affiliation not provided to SSRN
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RAFFAELLA COPPIER, Università degli Studi di Macerata - Department of Economic & Financial Institutions (DIEF)
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GUSTAVO PIGA, University of Rome
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This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate of a country. We provide a simple theoretical model. We show that a nonlinear relationship between fractionalization and corruption exists: corruption is high in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, constituencies act as a check and balance device to limit ethnically-based corruption. Consequently, the relationship between fractionalization and growth rate is also non-linear: growth is high in the middle range of ethnic diversity, low in homogeneous or very fragmented countries. | | ^top Solicitation of Abstracts To submit your research to SSRN, log in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, and click on the My Papers link on the left menu, and then click on Start New Submission at the top of the page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
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Harvard Business School, Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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