if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Javier Adrián López Artero, Universidad de Alicante
Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano, University of Alicante
Daniela Vuri, University of Rome Tor Vergata, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Gian Luigi Albano, Consip SPA, LUISS "G. Carli", Department of Economics and Finance, Libera Universita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali
Walter Ferrarese, Independent
Alberto Iozzi, Universita degli Studi di Roma
Roberto Pezzuto, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, Students Enrico Mattia Salonia, University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "When the Going Gets Tough: the Impact of Health Shocks on Divorce " 
CEIS Working Paper No. 597 JAVIER ADRIÁN LÓPEZ ARTERO, Universidad de Alicante
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ANNA SANZ-DE-GALDEANO, University of Alicante
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DANIELA VURI, University of Rome Tor Vergata, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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We analyze the impact of unexpected health shocks-defined as the sudden diagnosis of cancer, stroke, or heart attack-on the probability of couple dissolution using longitudinal representative data on older individuals (50+). We leverage the longitudinal nature of the HRS and utilize a quasi-experimental research approach that creates counterfactual scenarios for affected households by comparing them to households set to experience the same event in subsequent years. We find that experiencing a health shock significantly increases the probability of couple dissolution by approximately 19% of the mean divorce prevalence. This effect intensifies gradually over time rather than appearing immediately after the adverse health event. Additionally, we examine several mechanisms through which health shocks may influence divorce, focusing on three potential channels: mental health, cognitive decline, and financial strain. Our findings suggest that all three mechanisms likely play a role in mediating the relationship between health shocks and the increased probability of divorce. "Should I Share or Should I Not? On the Sharing of Information on Past Performance in Procurement"
CEIS Working Paper No. 598 GIAN LUIGI ALBANO, Consip SPA, LUISS "G. Carli", Department of Economics and Finance, Libera Universita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali
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WALTER FERRARESE, Independent
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ALBERTO IOZZI, Universita degli Studi di Roma
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ROBERTO PEZZUTO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, Students
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Many real-world public-sector purchases involve a combination of verifiable and non-verifiable dimensions of quality, leading to a classical incomplete-contracting problem. This paper analyses how public buyers may use debarment lists-in essence, blacklists of under-performing contractors-to incentivize quality provision in repeated procurement tenders. A key question is whether debarment lists should be shared among multiple agencies or maintained separately. Sharing multiplies the punishment for bad performance (an under-performing firm loses access to all agencies, not just one), which might strongly deter shirking. However, this paper shows that sharing debarment lists backfires when mistakes may occur in judging quality ex-post: if one agency erroneously penalizes a cooperative contractor, that error propagates to every agency, potentially discouraging contractors from exerting high quality in the first place. By modelling repeated interactions and allowing for observational errors, we show the implicit costs stemming from a shared debarment list, and draw policy lessons for designing blacklists in public procurement. "Identifying Belief-dependent Preferences"
CEIS Working Paper No. 599 ENRICO MATTIA SALONIA, University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics
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Why are investors overconfident and trade excessively? Why do patients at health risk avoid testing? Why are voters polarised? Possibly because their beliefs directly influence their well-being, i.e., they have belief-dependent preferences. However, existing theories of belief-dependent preferences struggle to generate testable predictions or to identify simultaneously beliefs and preferences. This paper addresses these issues by providing an axiomatic characterization of a class of preferences and belief-updating rules that deviate from Bayesian updating. Preferences, beliefs, and updating rules are identified from choices over contingent menus, each entailing a menu of acts available at a later time contingent on an uncertain state of the world. The results provide a theory-based approach to experimental designs to test information avoidance, distortion, and other behaviours consistent with beliefdependent preferences. | | ^top
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