if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Marco Carli, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS) Elisabetta Iossa, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Chiara Latour, Stockholm University Luca Delle Foglie, University of Tor Vergata
Stefano Papa, Sapienza University of Rome
Giancarlo Spagnolo, University of Rome Tor Vergata, EIEF, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Green Ambiguity" 
CEIS Research paper No 591, Vol.23, Issue 1 MARCO CARLI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS)
Email:
">
Agents may be unsure about the productive potential of green technology and of the non-polluting sector due to imprecise information or misguiding news. I study the impact of this deep uncertainty in the context of the transition to a low-carbon economy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with polluting and green sectors and agents who, due to their ambiguity aversion, take decisions under pessimistic expectations about the future productivity of the latter sector. In the short term, losses of confidence can shift the balance of the economy in favor of investment in the polluting sector and lead to an increase in emissions. Coupling environmental tax and green subsidy can partially counteract this imbalance when the long-run forecast of agents ends up realizing, while also avoiding delays in the green transition. A dynamic version of the policy mix is also able to mitigate the short-term effects of drops in confidence. "Firms' Legality and Efficiency: Evidence from Public Procurement "
CEIS Working Paper No 592, Vol.23, Issue 1 ELISABETTA IOSSA, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Email:
">
CHIARA LATOUR, Stockholm University
Email:
">
Do firms with higher legality standards contribute to better procurement outcomes? We address this question in the context of Italian public works procurement, by combining contract-level data on procurement and firm-level data on legality scores, using the Legality Rating System managed by the Italian Antitrust Authority. We find that higher legality scores are positively associated with a significant and economically important improvement in procurement efficiency, measured by shorter time delays and lower extra costs. "Rage Against the Machine or Humans? "
CEIS Working Paper No 593, Vol.23, Issue 1 LUCA DELLE FOGLIE, University of Tor Vergata
Email:
">
STEFANO PAPA, Sapienza University of Rome
Email:
">
GIANCARLO SPAGNOLO, University of Rome Tor Vergata, EIEF, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Email:
">
We examine how betrayal aversion and ambiguity attitudes influence trust. To disentangle these effects, we use a Trust game and manipulate trustors' perception of being the intentional recipients of trustees' betrayal by varying the nature of the latter: a human or a machine that replicates human choices in probability. After confirming that this manipulation does not affect ambiguity attitudes or beliefs about others' behavior, we find that both factors significantly influence trust. Nonetheless, even when controlling for these attitudes and beliefs, participants exhibit lower trust in humans than in machine. Furthermore, using Noldus' FaceReader technology to measure emotions during trustors' decision-making process, we find that participants express greater anger toward human trustees. Our results indicate that both betrayal aversion and ambiguity attitudes play important roles in shaping trust decisions. | | ^top
About this eJournal Submissions To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
">
Distributed by Economics Research Network (ERN), a division of Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) | | | | | | Subscription Management You can change your journal subscriptions by logging into SSRN User HQ. Questions? Please visit the SSRN Support Center to access live chat assistance or use our email ticketing system. | | Site Subscription Membership Many university departments and other institutions have purchased site subscriptions covering all of the eJournals in a particular network. If you want to subscribe to any of the SSRN eJournals, you may be able to do so without charge by first checking to see if your institution currently has a site subscription. To do this please click on any of the following URLs. Instructions for joining the site are included on these pages. If your institution or department is not listed as a site, we would be happy to work with you to set one up. Please contact
">
for more information. | | Individual Membership (for those not covered by a site subscription) Join a site subscription, request a trial subscription, or purchase a subscription within the SSRN User HeadQuarters: https://hq.ssrn.com/Subscriptions.cfm | | Financial Hardship If you are undergoing financial hardship and believe you cannot pay for an eJournal, please send a detailed explanation to
">
| |
To ensure delivery of this eJournal, please add
">
(Economics Research Network) to your email contact list. Questions? Please visit the SSRN Support Center. FORWARDING & REDISTRIBUTION Subscriptions to the journal are for single users. You may forward a particular eJournal issue, or an excerpt from an issue, to an individual or individuals who might be interested in it. It is a violation of copyright to redistribute this eJournal on a recurring basis to another person or persons, without the permission of SSRN. For information about individual subscriptions and site subscriptions, please contact us at
">
| | Follow SSRN:
  Copyright © 2025 Elsevier, Inc. All Rights Reserved | |
|
