if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Giampaolo Arachi, Econpubblica - Università Bocconi, Università di Lecce - Dpto. di Scienze Economiche e Matematico-Statistiche
Debora Assisi, University of Bari "Aldo Moro"
Cesi Berardino, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Tor Vergata Economics University Foundation
Michele Giuranno, University of Salento
Felice Russo, Universita di Lecce - Departmento of Scienze Economiche e Matematico-Statistiche Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Edoardo Di Porto, CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)
Joanna Kopinska, Sapienza University of Rome, DISSE, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS)
Maarten Lindeboom, VU University Amsterdam Marc Escrihuela‐Villar, University of the Balearic Islands
Walter Ferrarese, Universitat de Les Illes Balears
Alberto Iozzi, Universita degli Studi di Roma | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Public Procurement" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 548 GIAMPAOLO ARACHI, Econpubblica - Università Bocconi, Università di Lecce - Dpto. di Scienze Economiche e Matematico-Statistiche
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DEBORA ASSISI, University of Bari "Aldo Moro"
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CESI BERARDINO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Tor Vergata Economics University Foundation
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MICHELE GIURANNO, University of Salento
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FELICE RUSSO, Universita di Lecce - Departmento of Scienze Economiche e Matematico-Statistiche
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This paper assesses the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on public procurement (PP) performance, based on the Italian experience. We estimate a fixed effect regression model using a sample of 50,905 Italian public works contracts awarded both by municipalities and by municipal unions (MU) from 2012 to 2021. Results prove MU are more efficient than single municipalities at the execution, rather than the winning stage, of the tender. Public tenders awarded by MU show lower winning rebates, shorter delivery delays and, for less complex works, lower final execution extra costs. Furthermore, we investigate whether intergovernmental transfers may enhance PP performance. "Traumatic Experiences Adversely Affect Life Cycle Labor Market Outcomes of the Next Generation - Evidence from WWII Nazi Raids"
CEIS Working Paper No. 549 VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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EDOARDO DI PORTO, CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)
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JOANNA KOPINSKA, Sapienza University of Rome, DISSE, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS)
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MAARTEN LINDEBOOM, VU University Amsterdam This paper examines the causal effect of a traumatic event experienced by pregnant women on the life-long labor market outcomes of their offspring. We exploit a unique natural experiment that involved randomly placed Nazi raids in municipalities in Italy during WWII. We link administrative data on male private sector workers to information about Nazi raids and war casualties. Our results suggest that prenatal exposure to traumatic events affect offspring earnings throughout the working career and in retirement. The lower earnings are due to lower educational attainment, the type of jobs held and interruptions in working careers due to unemployment. We further find that prenatal exposure exacerbates the adverse effects of later life job loss on earnings. We use a medical database on health expenditures to interpret the effect estimates. The prenatally exposed have higher medical expenditures on diseases of the nervous system and mental disorders, indicating that stress is likely to be an important factor driving our findings. "On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less"
CEIS Working Paper No. 550 MARC ESCRIHUELA‐VILLAR, University of the Balearic Islands
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WALTER FERRARESE, Universitat de Les Illes Balears
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ALBERTO IOZZI, Universita degli Studi di Roma
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In bargainings, the parties’ bargaining powers (BPs) may determine not only how the surplus is shared (share effect), but also the size of the aggregate surplus (size effect). Since the size effect may be positive or negative, the sign of the effect on a party’s payoff of a change in her BP is in principle undetermined. We first look at a general model with a party (the principal) negotiating with two counterparts. At the Nash-in-Nash solution, we show that the equilibrium payoff of the principal may be decreasing in her BP. Necessary conditions for this to occur are an asymmetric bargaining model and a sufficiently large difference in the way the bargained upon variables affect the principal’s payoff. We then revisit a standard linear vertical industry with one upstream firm, downstream Cournot competition, and public contracts. A negative effect on the upstream firm’s profits deriving from an increase in her BP is always found when the firm has different BPs across the negotiations and final goods are complements. We map these conditions to those characterised in the general model. | | ^top
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