if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Nicola Amendola, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Giacomo Gabbuti, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
Giovanni Vecchi, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Sara Mancini, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Nazaria Solferino, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics Federico Belotti, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
Eloisa Campioni, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Vittorio Larocca, Luiss Guido Carli University
Francesca Marazzi, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Luca Panaccione, Sapienza University of Rome
Andrea Piano Mortari, CEIS Tor Vergata | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "On Some Problems of Using the Human Development Index in Economic History" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 527, 2021 NICOLA AMENDOLA, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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GIACOMO GABBUTI, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
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GIOVANNI VECCHI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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We argue against the use of composite indices, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), in economic history. We show that the HDI can be interpreted as a formal representation of the analyst’s ethical system. We support our claim by introducing a new class of paternalistic social welfare functions (Graaff 1957, Mas-Colell, 1995) which encompasses all the HDI formulas put forth by the literature. The theoretical framework is illustrated by an empirical investigation of the long-run evolution of Italians’ living standards and civic liberties. We conclude that any history based on composite indices is one where both data and history play a minor role, if any. "The Effect of Mandatory Non-Financial Reporting on CSR (And Environmentally Sustainable) Investment: a Discontinuity Design Approach"
CEIS Working Paper No. 528, November 2021 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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SARA MANCINI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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NAZARIA SOLFERINO, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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We investigate the effects of the introduction of non-financial reporting (NFR) on investment related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We focus on environmental sustainability by using as exogenous treatment the Italian implementation of the EU Directive 2014/95 that has made NFR mandatory for companies of 500 employees and above passing threshold levels of either net sales or total assets. We estimate the causal effect on data from the ISTAT Multiscopo Survey (including the universe of middle and large sized Italian companies and a large sample of small companies) with a fuzzy discontinuity design approach and find evidence of a sharp discontinuity around the cutoff. Our empirical findings show that mandatory NFR is associated to significant positive effects on CSR investments in some crucial domains (waste management, recycle/reused material in inputs, pollution control, emission reduction). Their magnitude implies that between 20 to 30 percent of additional firms are involved in CSR investments in general and specifically in all the considered types of environmentally sustainable investment. Policy implications of our findings are that the reduction of the mandatory NFR threshold including also medium sized firms could significantly contribute to extend corporate investment in CSR and, more specifically, in environmental sustainability. "Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games"
CEIS Working Paper No. 529 FEDERICO BELOTTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
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ELOISA CAMPIONI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
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VITTORIO LAROCCA, Luiss Guido Carli University
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FRANCESCA MARAZZI, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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LUCA PANACCIONE, Sapienza University of Rome
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ANDREA PIANO MORTARI, CEIS Tor Vergata
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We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants exhibit an adaptive behavior, since the main drivers of their decisions to withdraw are: previous-round outcomes and own initial choice. Moreover, they mainly adopt the best response to previous-round feedback. However, a sizeable share of participants adopts the opposite mode of behavior, that we refer to as experimentation. The analysis of the determinants of experimentation suggest that subjects adopt this behavior when the probability to lead the group toward the efficient outcome is higher. Finally, our analysis shows that the size of the bank has a significant effect on participants’ decisions, since they withdraw more and experiment less in large banks. | | ^top
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