ERN CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series, Vol. 17 No. 9, 11/25/2019


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  • Subject: ERN CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series, Vol. 17 No. 9, 11/25/2019
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Title: CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series :: SSRN

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Table of Contents

Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Francesco Decarolis, Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Fabio Franco, Independent

Giovanni Mellace, University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics
Alessandra Pasquini, CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata


CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director

"Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders" Free Download
CEIS Working Paper No. 472

VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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FRANCESCO DECAROLIS,
Bocconi University - Department of Economics
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The public procurement of medical devices is increasingly relying on auction mechanisms to move toward more transparent procedures and to promote competition between suppliers in a market where the quality of the products matters enormously and an improper auction design could be very harmful. Based on Italian hospital data, we present new evidence on the performance of the public tenders to procure orthopaedic prosthesis for hips, knees and shoulders. Focusing on three main outcomes, the number of participants, the presence of a single firm bidding and the winning rebate, for the first time we describe how features related to the tender, hospital, region and bidders' competition all contribute to explain the functioning of the procurement auctions. The evidence we obtain can meaningfully help policy makers in designing and implementing better public procurement systems.

"Efficient Particle MCMC with GMM Likelihood Representation" Free Download
CEIS Working Paper No. 473

FABIO FRANCO, Independent
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Particle Markov Chain Monte Carlo (PMCMC) is a widely used method to handle estimation problem in the context of nonlinear structural dynamic models whose likelihood function is analytically intractable. PMCMC can be constructed upon a GMM likelihood representation when one does not want to rely on the structural form of the measurement equation (Gallant et al 2016). It only requires to compute moment conditions available from the structural model. However, particle lter with GMM may suffer from high degeneracy of particle weights which severely affects the accuracy of Monte Carlo approximations and in turn Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimates. This work is concerned with revising particle GMM algorithm as proposed in Gallant et al in order to reduce the depletion problem. Estimation results of stochastic volatility models show that the efficient block sampling strategy as proposed in Doucet et al (2006) can outperform particle GMM and in turn deliver more reliable MCMC estimates. Auxiliary particle lter (Doucet et al, 2011) is also proposed as an alternative strategy to the block sampling approach. However, in the intended experiments it does not seem to be very effective. Thus some of the assumptions needed to estimate structural nonlinear state space models can be weakened and requiring only available moment conditions without affecting dramatically the conclusions.

"Identify More, Observe Less: Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control" Free Download
CEIS Working Paper No. 474

GIOVANNI MELLACE, University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics
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ALESSANDRA PASQUINI,
CEIS, University of Rome Tor Vergata
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The synthetic control method (SCM) allows estimation of the causal effect of an intervention in settings where panel data on just a few treated units and control units are available. We show that the existing SCM as well as its extensions can be easily modified to estimate how much of the total effect goes through observed causal channels. The additional assumptions needed are arguably very mild in many settings. Furthermore, in an illustrative empirical application we estimate the effects of adopting the euro on labor productivity in several countries and show that a reduction in the Economic Complexity Index helped to mitigate the negative short run effects of adopting the new currency in some countries and boosted the positive effects in others.

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  • ERN CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series, Vol. 17 No. 9, 11/25/2019, Barbara Piazzi

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