if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Andrea Attar, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
Eloisa Campioni, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Thomas Mariotti, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole
Gwenael Piaser, IPAG Business School Anatole Cheysson, European University Institute, Economics Department (ECO)
Nicolò Fraccaroli, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics, Law and Institutions, Bank of England Federico Belotti, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
Giancarlo Ferrara, University of Palermo - Department of Economics | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Furio Camillo Rosati - Director "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 460 ANDREA ATTAR, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
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ELOISA CAMPIONI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
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THOMAS MARIOTTI, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole
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GWENAEL PIASER, IPAG Business School
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We study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals first simultaneously post mechanisms, then agents simultaneously choose to participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, which is common to competing-auction and competitive-search applications, we develop two examples that question the relevance of the folk theorems for competing-mechanism games documented in the literature. The first example shows that there can exist pure-strategy equilibria in which some principal obtains a payoffs below her min-max payoffs, computed over all principals' decisions. Thus folk-theorem results may have to involve a bound on principals' payoffs that depends on the spaces of messages available to the agents, and not only on the players' available actions. The second example shows that even this non-intrinsic approach is misleading when agents' participation decisions are strategic: there can exist incentive-feasible allocations in which principals obtain payoffs above their min-max payoffs, computed over arbitrary spaces of mechanisms, but which cannot be supported in equilibrium. "Ideology in Times of Crisis: A Principal Component Analysis of Votes in the European Parliament, 2004–2019"
CEIS Working Paper No. 461 ANATOLE CHEYSSON, European University Institute, Economics Department (ECO)
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NICOLÃ’ FRACCAROLI, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics, Law and Institutions, Bank of England
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This paper aims to identify the main dividing lines that determine the voting behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and how they evolved throughout the crisis. Introducing a new database that collects and classifies the full population of plenary votes from 2004 to 2019, this work uses principal component analysis to identify the latent patterns on which MEPs ally and divide. Focussing on economic votes, it finds that, while pre-crisis votes were mainly determined by differences across the left-vs-right spectrum and, only secondly, by differences in support for European integration, the crisis inverted this trend, making support for Europe the most relevant dividing line in the European Parliament. In support of this evidence, the paper introduces a new vote-scraping technique to investigate the ideological nature of these dimensions. Vote scraping reveals that the left-right cleavage is mainly ideological but with limited impact on budgetary resources, whereas the European dimension mostly reflects a conflict over the budget, with higher legislative impact and seemingly low ideological content. "Flexible Estimation of Heteroskedastic Stochastic Frontier Models via Two-step Iterative Nonlinear Least Squares"
CEIS Working Paper No. 462 FEDERICO BELOTTI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for Economics and International Studies (CEIS)
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GIANCARLO FERRARA, University of Palermo - Department of Economics
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This article illustrates a straightforward and useful method for incorporating exogenous inefficiency effects in the estimation of semiparametric stochastic frontier models. An iterative estimation algorithm based on two-step nonlinear least squares is developed allowing for any flexible and monotonic specification of the production technology. We investigate the behavior of the proposed procedure through a set of Monte Carlo experiments comparing its finite sample properties with those of available alternatives. The new algorithm provides very good performance, outperforming the competitors in small samples and in presence of small signal-to-noise ratios. Two applications to agricultural data illustrate the usefulness of the proposed algorithm, even when it is used as a tool for sensitivity analysis. | | ^top
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