if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Luisa Corrado, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance
Salvatore Di Novo, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance Luca Brugnolini, Central Bank of Malta Research Department, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance Andrea Attar, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
Eloisa Campioni, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Gwenael Piaser, IPAG Business School | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Estimating Models with Dynamic Network Interactions and Unobserved Heterogeneity" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 439 LUISA CORRADO, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
SALVATORE DI NOVO, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
In this paper, we propose an approach to estimate models with network interactions in the presence of individual unobserved heterogeneity. The latter may impact the formation of ties and/or exogenous effects, thereby undermining identification of the associated parameters. In a panel setting, we devise a way to cope with these sources of endogeneity by relying on observable variations. When exogenous effects are involved, one can control for unobserved heterogeneity by including time-averages of the endogenous variables. When unobserved individual traits affect the process of network formation, it is possible to explore the role of network statistics. We derive a 2SLS estimator in order to address simultaneity bias, relying on sources of variation provided by the product between successive powers of the network matrix and the matrix of exogenous covariates; we assess the performances of the method via a Monte Carlo exercise, considering various combination of models and different ranges of parameters for both network interactions and the social multiplier. We also separately assess the cases in which unobserved sources hit the network structure only or act on exogenous effects as well. Focusing on the former case, our approach may be also applied when a simple cross-section is available. More generally, it does not require full knowledge of the spectrum of agents' interactions. "About Local Projection Impulse Response Function Reliability"
CEIS Working Paper No. 440 LUCA BRUGNOLINI, Central Bank of Malta Research Department, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
I compare the performance of the vector autoregressive (VAR) model impulse response function estimator with the JordĂ (2005) local projection (LP) methodology. In a Monte Carlo experiment, I demonstrate that when the data generating process is a well-specified VAR, the standard impulse response function estimator is the best option. However, when the sample size is small, and the model lag-length is misspecified, I prove that the local projection estimator is a competitive alternative. Finally, I show how to improve the local projection performance by fixing the lag-length at each horizon. "On Competing Mechanisms Under Exclusive Competition"
CEIS Working Paper No. 441 ANDREA ATTAR, University of Roma Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics
Email:
">
ELOISA CAMPIONI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
GWENAEL PIASER, IPAG Business School
Email:
">
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents’ exogenous private information. This paper investigates the rationale for this restriction. We provide two results. First, we construct examples showing that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium outcomes survive against principals’ unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. | | ^top
About this eJournal Submissions To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
">
Distributed by Economics Research Network (ERN), a division of Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Directors ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTERS PAPERS MICHAEL C. JENSEN
Harvard Business School, SSRN, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit
Email:
">
Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for ERN-RES. | | | | | | Subscription Management You can change your journal subscriptions by logging into SSRN User HQ. If you have questions or problems with this process, please email
">
or call 877-SSRNHelp (877.777.6435 or 212.448.2500). Outside of the United States, call 00+1+212+4482500. | | Site Subscription Membership Many university departments and other institutions have purchased site subscriptions covering all of the eJournals in a particular network. If you want to subscribe to any of the SSRN eJournals, you may be able to do so without charge by first checking to see if your institution currently has a site subscription. To do this please click on any of the following URLs. Instructions for joining the site are included on these pages. If your institution or department is not listed as a site, we would be happy to work with you to set one up. Please contact
">
for more information. | | Individual Membership (for those not covered by a site subscription) Join a site subscription, request a trial subscription, or purchase a subscription within the SSRN User HeadQuarters: https://hq.ssrn.com/Subscriptions.cfm | | Financial Hardship If you are undergoing financial hardship and believe you cannot pay for an eJournal, please send a detailed explanation to
">
| |
To ensure delivery of this eJournal, please add
">
(Economics Research Network) to your email contact list. If you are missing an issue or are having any problems with your subscription, please Email
">
or call 877-SSRNHELP (877.777.6435 or 585.442.8170). FORWARDING & REDISTRIBUTION Subscriptions to the journal are for single users. You may forward a particular eJournal issue, or an excerpt from an issue, to an individual or individuals who might be interested in it. It is a violation of copyright to redistribute this eJournal on a recurring basis to another person or persons, without the permission of SSRN. For information about individual subscriptions and site subscriptions, please contact us at
">
| | Copyright © 2018 Elsevier, Inc. All Rights Reserved | |
|
