if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Luisa Corrado, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance
Tobias Schuler, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute Alberto Bucci, University of Milan - Department of Business Policy and Economics
Lorenzo Carbonari, UniversitĂ di Roma "Tor Vergata"
Giovanni Trovato, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Luca Corazzini, Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia
Vittorio Pelligra, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Financial Bubbles in Interbank Lending" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 427 LUISA CORRADO, University of Rome Tor Vergata Department of Economics and Finance
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TOBIAS SCHULER, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute
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As a result of the global
financial crisis countercyclical capital requirements have been discussed to prevent fi
nancial bubbles generated in the banking sector and to mitigate the adverse effects of fi
nancial repression after a bubble burst. This paper analyses the effects of an endogenous capital requirement based on the credit-to-GDP gap along with other policy instruments. We develop a macroeconomic framework which endogenizes market expectations on asset values and allows for interbank transactions. We then show how a bubble in the banking sector relaxes fi
nancing constraints. In policy experiments we
find that an endogenous capital requirement can effectively reduce the impact of a
financial bubble. We show that central bank intervention ("leaning against the wind") instead has only a minor effect. Â "Variety, Competition, and Population in Economic Growth: Theory and Empirics"
CEIS Working Paper No. 428 ALBERTO BUCCI, University of Milan - Department of Business Policy and Economics
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LORENZO CARBONARI, UniversitĂ di Roma "Tor Vergata"
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GIOVANNI TROVATO, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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We provide aggregate macroeconomic evidence on how, in the long-run, a diverse degree of production-complexity may affect not only the rate of economic growth, but also the correlation between the latter, population growth and the monopolistic (intermediate) markups. For a sample of OECD economies, we find that the losses due to more complexity in production are lower than the corresponding specialization gains. According to our theoretical model, this implies that the impact of population change on economic growth is slightly positive. Using a Finite Mixture Model, we also classify the countries in the sample and verify for each cluster the impact that the population growth rate and the intermediate sector's markups exert on the 5-year average real GDP growth rate. "We Can Be Heroes Trust and Resilience in Corrupted Economic Environments"
CEIS Working Paper No. 429 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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LUCA CORAZZINI, Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia
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VITTORIO PELLIGRA, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
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We use an original variant of the standard trust game, in order to study the effect of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find slightly higher trustor’s giving in presence of corruption, matched by a significant effect of excess reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect on average corruption acting as a tax, inelastic to changes in the risk of corruptor audit. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption, and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes in history where examples of commendable giving were used to stimulate emulation of the ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy. | | ^top
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