if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Elisabetta Iossa, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)
Michael Waterson, University of Warwick - Department of Economics Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Maurizio Fiaschetti, SOAS University of London, Oxford University - Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment
Francesco Salustri, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance Eloisa Campioni, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Vittorio Larocca, LUISS Guido Carli University - Luiss School of Government
Loredana Mirra, University of Rome, Tor Vergata
Luca Panaccione, University of Rome, Tor Vergata | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A Case Study on the London Bus Market" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 400 ELISABETTA IOSSA, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)
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MICHAEL WATERSON, University of Warwick - Department of Economics
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Under recurrent procurement, the awarding of a contract to a firm may put it in an advantageous position in future tenders, which may reduce competition over time. The objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of competition for tendered contracts, focusing on factors that may generate incumbent advantage. Particular attention is given to learning economies, sunk costs of entry and switching costs for the procurer. The paper then applies these insights to analyse empirically the evolution of competition in the market for local bus services in London. "The Impact of Cash Mobs in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results"
CEIS Working Paper No. 401 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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MAURIZIO FIASCHETTI, SOAS University of London, Oxford University - Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment
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FRANCESCO SALUSTRI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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We simulate in a randomised lab experiment the effect of Cash Mobs on consumers’ behaviour in an original variant of the multiplayer Prisoner’s dilemma called Vote-with-the-wallet Game (VWG). The effect is modelled in a sequential game with/without an environmental frame in which a subset of players (cash-mobbers) is given the opportunity to reveal publicly (in aggregate without disclosing individual identities) their cooperation decision. We find that the treatment has a positive gross effect, that is, the share of cooperators is significantly higher in treated sessions and this is mainly due to the higher share of cooperators among cash-mobbers. Our results suggest that cash mobs-like mechanisms can help to solve social dilemmas with entirely private solutions (not based on punishment but on positive action) without costs for government budgets. "Financial Literacy and Bank Runs: An Experimental Analysis"
CEIS Working Paper No. 402 ELOISA CAMPIONI, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
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VITTORIO LAROCCA, LUISS Guido Carli University - Luiss School of Government
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LOREDANA MIRRA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata
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LUCA PANACCIONE, University of Rome, Tor Vergata
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In this experimental study on the determinants of bank run, participants anonymously interact via an experimental bank deciding whether to withdraw or not their deposit. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), runs result from a fundamental coordination problem. We elicit subjects’ financial literacy and study whether revealing this information helps in solving the equilibrium coordination in such games with multiple equilibria. As a control we also use information about elicited general knowledge. Within the same framework, we let the bank size vary to investigate how it affects coordination on bank run. We find that, when no information is revealed, the likelihood of runs increases with bank size. Whereas, when information on financial literacy is revealed, the likelihood of runs increases in small and decreases in large banks. Our analyses also show that subjects react to information on financial literacy and general knowledge in a different way. Getting to know that a group has higher financial literacy reduces the probability of run. While, when information about general knowledge is revealed, risk aversion at group level becomes relevant and positively affects the probability of bank run. In all specifications, bank run occurrence is positively affected by short-run withdrawal history and by subjects’ experience. | | ^top
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