if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Aslihan Arslan, FAO of the UN (ESA), UC Davis - Agricultural and Resource Economics, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Federico Belotti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Leslie Lipper, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN Vincenzo Atella, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Alberto Holly, University of Lausanne
Alessandro Mistretta, Bank of Italy Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Vittorio Pelligra, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
Fiammetta Rossetti, University of Rome II | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "Smallholder Productivity and Weather Shocks: Adoption and Impact of Widely Promoted Agricultural Practices in Tanzania" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 388 ASLIHAN ARSLAN, FAO of the UN (ESA), UC Davis - Agricultural and Resource Economics, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
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FEDERICO BELOTTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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LESLIE LIPPER, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
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Food security in Tanzania is projected to deteriorate as a result of climate change. In spite of the efforts to promote agricultural practices to improve productivity and food security, adoption rates of such practices remain low. Developing a thorough understanding of the determinants of adoption and updating our understanding of the impacts of these technologies under the site-specific effects of climate change are crucial to improve food security. This paper addresses these issues by using a novel data set that combines information from two large-scale household surveys with geo-referenced historical rainfall and temperature data in order to understand the determinants of the adoption of a set of agricultural practices and their impacts on maize productivity under weather shocks in Tanzania. The specific practices analyzed are: maize-legume intercropping, soil and water conservation practices (SWC), the use of organic fertilizers, inorganic fertilizers and high yielding maize varieties. We fi
nd strong complementarities between these practices both in terms of adoption and yield impacts. Long-run variability in rainfall decreases the adoption of fertilizers (both organic and inorganic) and increases that of improved seeds. Access to information and extension increase the incentives to adopt modern inputs as well as SWC. Farmers in areas where the cropping season's rainfall has been highly variable and temperature has been unexpectedly high have signicantly lower maize yields. SWC emerges as one of the most important practices in increasing yields with significant benefits by itself, in combination with other practices, under average weather conditions as well as under rainfall and temperature shocks. The shocks we analyze are expected to increase under climate change, underlining the importance of policies to buffer food security from the estimated effects of climate change. This paper contributes to evidence base to support policies to advance food security under climate change by underlining the importance of integrating site-specific analyses of climatic variables and their interactions with promoted practices in policy design and targeting. "Disentangling Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Supply Induced Demand: An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Healthcare Services"
CEIS Working Paper No. 389 VINCENZO ATELLA, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS), Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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ALBERTO HOLLY, University of Lausanne
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ALESSANDRO MISTRETTA, Bank of Italy
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In the healthcare sector, Adverse Selection (AS), Moral Hazard (MH) and Supply Induced Demand (SID) are three very important phenomena that affect patients’ behaviour. Despite there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on these phenomena, so far, no contribution has been able to approach them jointly. This is mostly due to the difficulty to model the joint determinants of health service utilisation and health insurance choice by means of a tractable structural simultaneous equation model. In this paper, we provide a solution to this problem and estimate a simultaneous four equation structural model with four latent variables, where the first two equations are meant to deal with the adverse selection issue, while the third and fourth equation deal with moral hazard and SID issues. A closed form solution for the likelihood function - which guarantees an exact solution - is maximised by the means of FIML, using a large cross-sectional dataset from the Italian healthcare system. Empirical analysis has confirmed the theoretical predictions of our structural model. In particular, we find evidence of AS in the choice of private insurance and SID, but do not find MH behaviour on the patient side. These results are extremely important from a health policy perspective, given the existing debate on the development of a second pillar in the financing of the healthcare system in Italy and Europe. "The Corporate Legality Game. A Lab Experiment on the Impact of Policies, Frames and Information"
CEIS Working Paper No. 390 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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VITTORIO PELLIGRA, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
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FIAMMETTA ROSSETTI, University of Rome II
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A company that pursues illicit practices (e.g., money laundering, tax dodging, corruption of public officials in procurement races, etc.) may underprice and crowd out competitors that behave legally, thereby eroding the public good of legality and integrity. Recently born institutional legality ratings tackle this problem by signaling companies with excellent legality record to consumers. Redistributive policy actions aimed to tax “defectors” (i.e. buyers of unrated products) in favor of “co-operators” (i.e. buyers of “legality-rated” products) may further enforce legality, and fight corruption. We analyze the impact of the legality-rating frame by means of a randomized experiment. The experiment accounts for the effects of fiscal policies that redistribute income from defectors to co-operators either in presence or in absence of the legality frame. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism, the legality frame and the conformity information design contribute to alleviate the prisoner’s dilemma and generate significant deviations from the Nash Equilibrium. | | ^top
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