if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Rodrigo Montes, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Wilfried Sandâ€Zantman, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Tommaso M. Valletti, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Francesco Lautizi, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance Leonardo Becchetti, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
Vittorio Pelligra, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
Francesco Salustri, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics, Law and Institutions, University of Rome, Tor Vergata | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "The Value of Personal Information in Markets with Endogenous Privacy" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 352 RODRIGO MONTES, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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WILFRIED SANDâ€ZANTMAN, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
TOMMASO M. VALLETTI, Imperial College Business School, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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This paper investigates the effects of price discrimination on prices, profits and consumer surplus, when one or more competing firms can use consumers' private information to price discriminate and consumers can pay a privacy cost to avoid it. While a monopolist always benefits from higher privacy costs, this is not true in the competing duopoly case. In this last case, firms' individual profits are decreasing while consumer surplus is increasing in the privacy cost. Finally, under competition, we show that the optimal selling strategy for the owner of consumer data consists in dealing exclusively with one firm in order to create maximal competition between the winner and the loser of data. This brings inefficiencies, and we show that policy makers should concentrate their attention on exclusivity deals rather than making it easier for consumers to protect their privacy. "Large Scale Covariance Estimates for Portfolio Selection"
CEIS Working Paper No. 353 FRANCESCO LAUTIZI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance
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We propose an estimator of the Covariance Matrix (SWSE) of a large number of assets. This estimator improves the Similarity Weighted Estimator (SWE) introduced in Munnix et al. (2014), by combining it with the shrinkage estimator of the sample covariance matrix towards the market factor developed by Ledoit and Wolf (2003). We compare the performance of our estimator to some alternatives already available form the literature and the industry. For this purpose we analyse both statistical and economic measures associated to the Global Minimum Variance (GMV) Portfolio, composed by the stocks included in the S&P 500 index and computed using the different estimators considered in our comparison. "The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results"
CEIS Working Paper No. 354 LEONARDO BECCHETTI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
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VITTORIO PELLIGRA, Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economics
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FRANCESCO SALUSTRI, University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Department of Economics, Law and Institutions, University of Rome, Tor Vergata
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We use the Vote-with-the-Wallet game (VWG) to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma (PD) we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behavior in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium. | | ^top
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