if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Daniela Di Cagno, LUISS, Rome
Arianna Galliera, LUISS Guido Carli University - Department of Economics
Werner Güth, LUISS Guido Carli University, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Luca Panaccione, University of Rome II Alessandra Luati, University of Bologna - Department of Statistics
Tommaso Proietti, University of Rome II - Department of Economics and Finance Elisabetta Iossa, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) | | CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Vincenzo Atella - Director "A Hybrid Public Good Experiment Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 343 DANIELA DI CAGNO, LUISS, Rome
Email:
">
ARIANNA GALLIERA, LUISS Guido Carli University - Department of Economics
Email:
">
WERNER GÜTH, LUISS Guido Carli University, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH, Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Email:
">
LUCA PANACCIONE, University of Rome II
Email:
">
Similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we try to understand and explain the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level and three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the only adjusting player, learns that the other's independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger than the own one. We systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels.
Surprisingly, there is a strong framing effect which increases with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward adaptation. "Generalised Partial Autocorrelations and the Mutual Information between Past and Future"
CEIS Working Paper No. 344 ALESSANDRA LUATI, University of Bologna - Department of Statistics
Email:
">
TOMMASO PROIETTI, University of Rome II - Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
">
The paper introduces the generalised partial autocorrelation (GPAC) coefficients of a stationary stochastic process. The latter are related to the generalised autocovariances, the inverse Fourier transform coefficients of a power transformation of the spectral density function. By interpreting the generalised partial autocorrelations as the partial autocorrelation coefficients of an auxiliary process, we derive their properties and relate them to essential features of the original process.
Based on a parameterisation suggested by Barndorff-Nielsen and Schou (1973) and on Whittle likelihood, we develop an estimation strategy for the GPAC coefficients. We further prove that the GPAC coefficients can be used to estimate the mutual information between the past and the future of a time series. "Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead"
CEIS Working Paper No. 345 ELISABETTA IOSSA, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)
Email:
">
We review international practice in concession-based public private partnerships (PPPs) for highways, in the light of the economic theory of incentives, procurement and regulation. In particular, we analyse alternative funding mechanisms to cover highway costs, and their impact on demand risk allocation, incentives, cost of capital, and likelihood of renegotiation. We note how real tolls must pursue a number of contrasting objectives, which may be best served by introducing tariff discrimination. We discuss alternative tariff regulations used in practice and warn against tariff mechanisms that transfer demand risk to users and depart from the principles of price cap regulation. We highlight that it is desirable to transfer some traffic risk to the concessionaire but the level of risk transfer should be lower at the beginning of the contract, especially for greenfield projects where little demand information is initially available. We discuss the procurement of highway PPPs, focusing on the choice of the bidding variables, and on the distortions that renegotiations introduce at bidding stage. We stress the importance of strong institutions and absence of political interference in regulatory matters, and we highlight the benefit of respecting and standardizing contract terms. | | ^top About this eJournal Submissions To submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution Services If your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email:
">
Distributed by Economics Research Network (ERN), a division of Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Directors ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTERS PAPERS MICHAEL C. JENSEN
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc., Harvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Email:
">
Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for ERN-RES. | | | | | | Subscription Management You can change your journal subscriptions by logging into SSRN User HQ. If you have questions or problems with this process, please email
">
or call 877-SSRNHelp (877.777.6435 or 585.442.8170). Outside of the United States, call 00+1+585+4428170. | | Site Subscription Membership Many university departments and other institutions have purchased site subscriptions covering all of the eJournals in a particular network. If you want to subscribe to any of the SSRN eJournals, you may be able to do so without charge by first checking to see if your institution currently has a site subscription. To do this please click on any of the following URLs. Instructions for joining the site are included on these pages. If your institution or department is not listed as a site, we would be happy to work with you to set one up. Please contact
">
for more information. | | Individual Membership (for those not covered by a site subscription) Join a site subscription, request a trial subscription, or purchase a subscription within the SSRN User HeadQuarters: http://www.ssrn.com/subscribe | | Financial Hardship If you are undergoing financial hardship and believe you cannot pay for an eJournal, please send a detailed explanation to
">
| | To ensure delivery of this eJournal, please add
(Economics Research Network) to your email contact list. If you are missing an issue or are having any problems with your subscription, please Email
or call 877-SSRNHELP (877.777.6435 or 585.442.8170). FORWARDING & REDISTRIBUTION Subscriptions to the journal are for single users. You may forward a particular eJournal issue, or an excerpt from an issue, to an individual or individuals who might be interested in it. It is a violation of copyright to redistribute this eJournal on a recurring basis to another person or persons, without the permission of Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. For information about individual subscriptions and site subscriptions, please contact us at
">
| | Copyright © 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved | |
|
