CEIS-Tor Vergata is pleased to inform you that, on Friday May 22nd, 2015 at 12.00 pm, Wanda Mimra (ETH Zürich) will present a paper on “Multi-attribute quality competition with imperfect signals”
ABSTRACT
We model competition for a multi-attribute service, like health care services, where consumers observe attribute quality imprecisely before deciding on a provider. High quality in one attribute is more important in terms of ex post utility. Attribute quality is stochastic, providers can shift resources in order to increase expected quality in some attributes. Consumers rationally focus on attributes depending on signal precision and beliefs about the providers' resource allocations. When signal precision is such that consumers focus weakly on the less important attribute, any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is inefficient. Increasing signal precision can reduce welfare, as the positive effect of better provider selection is overcompensated by the negative effect that a shift in consumer focusing has on provider quality choice. We discuss the providers' incentives for information disclosure.
The Seminar will be held at the Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", B-building, 1° floor, room B
Please, go to www.ceistorvergata.it for the complete list of seminars and events at CEIS.
How to reach us: http://web.uniroma2.it/mobilita/index.html http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/area.asp?a=867
Barbara Piazzi
CEIS-Tor Vergata
Facoltà di Economia
Università di Roma Tor Vergata
via Columbia, 2
00133 Roma
tel +39.06.7259.5652
fax +39.06.2020687
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