CEIS-Tor Vergata is pleased to inform you that, on Friday March 7th, 2014 at 12.00 pm, Luigi Siciliani (University of York) will present a paper on “Should Incentive Schemes be High-powered or Low-powered in the Presence of Motivated Agents? ” ABSTRACT Pay-for-performance schemes that reward higher output or measurable dimensions of quality are increasingly advocated in the public sector. We investigate the optimal power of linear incentive schemes to finance public-service providers (eg in the health sector, education and child care) and identify conditions under which the presence of motivated agents implies that the power of the incentive scheme is high or low. The analysis is conducted both under symmetric and asymmetric information with respect to agents’ type. The Seminar will be held at the Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", B-building, 1° floor, room B Please, go to www.ceistorvergata.it for the complete list of seminars and events at CEIS. How to reach us: http://web.uniroma2.it/mobilita/index.html http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/area.asp?a=867 Barbara Piazzi __________ Informazioni da ESET NOD32 Antivirus, versione del database delle firme digitali 9493 (20140303) __________ Il messaggio è stato controllato da ESET NOD32 Antivirus. www.nod32.it |
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