if this message does not display correctly, click here | Table of Contents Mercedes Vellez, University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI) Ervin Prifti, University of Rome II
Daniela Vuri, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Alessio D'Amato, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
Amanda Spisto, University of Rome II | |
CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Luigi Paganetto - President, Pasquale Lucio Scandizzo - Director "Determinants of Price Discrimination in the Acquisition of Medical Devices" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 235 MERCEDES VELLEZ, University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI)
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Medical device expenditures are an important driver of the growth in health care spending and hospitals pay significantly different prices for the same medical device. This paper uses hospitals’ acquisition data to explore the determinants of price discrimination in the acquisition of medical devices across Italian hospitals considering demand factors such as institutional characteristics of the buyer, devices substitution patterns, area of localization, and purchase conditions. I find evidence that public hospital trusts and those located in northern regions are more efficient in acquiring medical devices, and that more flexibility in contracting with different device manufacturers and higher purchase volumes reduce the likelihood of paying higher prices. "Employment Protection and Fertility: Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform"
CEIS Working Paper No. 236 ERVIN PRIFTI, University of Rome II
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DANIELA VURI, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on fertility decisions of Italian working women using administrative data. We exploit a reform that introduced in 1990 costs for dismissals unmotivated by a 'fair cause' or 'justified motive' in firms below 15 employees and left ring costs unchanged for bigger firms. We use this quasi-experimental setup to study the hypothesis that increased EPL reduces future job insecurity and positively affects a female worker's proneness to take childbearing decisions. We use a difference in difference (OLS-DID) model to control for possible period-invariant sorting bias and an instrumental variable (IV-DID) model to account for time-varying endogeneity of the treatment status. We find that reduced economic insecurity following a strengthening of the EPL regime has a positive and sizable effect on fertility decisions of Italian working women. This result is robust to a number of checks regarding possible interactions with other policy reforms occurring around 1990, changes in the sample of workers and
firms, and use of an alternative set of exclusion restrictions. "A Carbon Tax Credit Policy in the Presence of Technological Spillovers"
CEIS Working Paper No. 237 ALESSIO D'AMATO, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
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AMANDA SPISTO, University of Rome II
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We model an environmental policy problem with two representative firms in two countries (one for each country). Firms are subject to environmental taxation, aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, and a unilateral technological spillover takes place: one of the two countries (innovating country) is responsible for generating the technological spillover while the other country is the one benefiting from the spillover effect. Two different scenarios are analysed: one where countries do not cooperate and one where a single supranational authority is in charge of setting environmental policy. At first, both countries feature emissions taxation aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. In such a case, we show that the standard international externality applies, i.e. a suboptimal emission tax rate is set, leading to larger than efficient pollution. However, the tax rate is larger than marginal national damages in the innovating country due to the need to provide incentives towards technical change. Then we present a setting where the two countries are both subject to a national tax on emissions but the innovating country introduces a tax credit which is directly proportional to the innovative effort. In such a setting, we obtain counterintuitive results: interestingly, for a sufficiently large spillover, the tax rate in the non cooperative setting might exceed the one arising under cooperation. | | ^top
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