CEIS-Tor Vergata is pleased to inform you that, on Friday March 16th, 2012 at 12.00 pm, prof. Volker Nocke (University of Mannheim) will present a paper on “Merger Policy with Merger Choice†The Seminar will be held at the Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", B-building, 1° floor, room B Please, go to www.ceistorvergata.it for the complete list of seminars and events at CEIS. How to reach us: http://web.uniroma2.it/mobilita/index.html http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/area.asp?a=867 ABSTRACT We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose which of several mutually exclusive mergers to propose. In our model, the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on "larger" mergers, i.e., those involving firms with a larger premerger market share, or equivalently, leading to a larger naively-computed post-merger Herfindahl index. The optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms. proposal incentives: firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one, but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers. Barbara Piazzi __________ Informazioni da ESET NOD32 Antivirus, versione del database delle firme digitali 6941 (20120305) __________ Il messaggio è stato controllato da ESET NOD32 Antivirus. www.nod32.it |
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