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CEIS: CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Luigi Paganetto - President, Pasquale Lucio Scandizzo - Director "Living Under the ‘Right’ Government: Does Political Ideology Matter to Trust in Political Institutions?" 
CEIS Working Paper No. 212 JUSTINA A.V. FISCHER, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Stockholm School of Economics, University of Hohenheim
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This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140,000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981-2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed. "Waste Sustainability, Environmental Management and Mafia: Analysing Geographical and Economic Dimensions"
CEIS Working Paper No. 213 ALESSIO D'AMATO, University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics
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MASSIMILIANO MAZZANTI, University of Ferrara
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FRANCESCO NICOLLI, University of Ferrara
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Waste management/disposal performances and a desirable delinking between income and waste trends are influenced by socio economic, institutional and policy factors. In highly regionalized settings many idiosyncratic factors of local interest influence waste management and disposal. Through an impact on policy enforcement costs, crime activities in a defined area and their geographical spillovers, may negatively affect legal forms of waste management and disposal. Given its high regional heterogeneity and known plague of Mafia in areas affected by recent 'waste crisis‘, Italy is a compelling case study: in full consistence to a theoretical model that analyzes how legal disposal (landfill), illegal disposal and recyclable waste levels are influenced by waste tariff and crime; econometric analysis on Italian provinces, shows that separated collection and legal forms of waste disposal are lower when crime spills are present. Crime activities erode and slow down the enhancement of waste management and disposal brought about by socio economic and structural factors enhanced by the introduction of newly crafted economic minded tariffs. | | ^top
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